개복치여관

2. 국가폭력과 저항폭력

사회과학에서는 흔히 근대 국가를 일정한 영토적 공간에서의 힘(force)의 합법적 독점체로 규정한다. 예컨대 앤터니 기든스, ꡔ현대사회학ꡕ, 김미숙 외 역, 을유문화사, 1992, 276쪽.
여기서 힘이라고 한 force를 우리말 번역에서는 ‘폭력’이라고 하나, 그 폭력은 당연히 위에서 말한 법적인 개념이 아니라 정치학적, 사회학적 개념으로써 힘을 말하는 것이므로 위에서 말한 법적 폭력과는 구별해야 한다. 여기서 국가의 폭력이라 함은 법적 차원에서 권력이라고 불리는 것의 다른 이름이다. 적어도 합법적 폭력인 권력인 한 그것을 불법적인 폭력이라고 할 수는 없다. 따라서 우리는 국가 자체를 폭력 조직으로 규정할 수는 없다. 이는 적어도 민주주의 국가에서 당연한 것이리라.
문제는 근대 국가가 합법적인 힘(폭력)의 독점인 권력을 주장함에도 불구하고, 경우에 따라 권력의 이름으로 부당한 폭력을 행사하기 일쑤이고, 이에 대한 저항으로서의 시민에 의한 저항의 폭력이 당연히 발생한다는 점에 있다. 이처럼 국가 기관이나 국가 관련 요원이 그 부당한 폭력에 의한 직간접의 희생자인 시민들에게 공포감과 복종심을 가질 수 있도록 폭력이나 위협행동을 의도적으로 행하는 것을 ‘국가폭력’(State Terror)이라고 할 수 있고, 이에 정당하게 저항하는 ‘저항폭력’을 대치시킬 수 있다. 따라서 저항폭력은 본질적으로 수동적인 것이고 정당성을 갖는 것이어야 한다.
이러한 두 폭력의 대치는 흔히 위기 상황에서 나타난다. 그 하나가 1920대의 독일에서였다. 즉 1917년 러시아에서 2월혁명(부르주아 혁명)과 10월혁명(프롤레타리아 혁명)을 거쳐 소비에트 정권이 수립되고, 이어 1918년 독일, 오스트리아-헝가리에서 11월 혁명이 터져 제국이 무너져 각지에서 혁명적 폭력 기관으로서 병사․노동자평의회가 수립되었다. 그 후 12월부터 이듬해 1월에 걸쳐 칼 리프크네히트와 로자 룩셈부르그에 의한 스팔타카스단의 폭력 봉기가 일어났으나 실패했다. 그런 가운데 프롤레타리아의 비권력적인 폭력에의 기대가 지식인들과 민중 사이에서 높아졌다.
이 시기에 와서, 시민적 권리=시민법의 주체로서 각 시민이, 자연상태에서 행사하는 ‘폭력’을 ‘법’의 경계선 안에서 하나의 ‘권력’으로 독점시킨다는 전제에 선 근대 시민사회는 중대한 위기를 맞았다. 즉 국가는 그 ‘권력’을 유지하고 확장하기 위해 권력의 본질인 ‘폭력’을 계속 추구하여 가장 야만적인 폭력인 제국주의 전쟁과 계급 갈등의 유지에로 나아갔고, 이에 대해 시민사회는 그것을 억제하기는커녕 도리어 국가가 주장하는 ‘이성’이나 ‘도덕’ 및 ‘법’이라는 것에 순응했다. 근대 국가의 시민법 질서 틀 안에서 ‘주체’로 자기를 형성한 ‘시민’에게는 법의 목표인 실질적인 ‘정의’를 구체적으로 실현할 혁명적 에너지가 없었기 때문이었다. 즉 부르주아 국가 틀이 온존되고 시민이 그 속에 존재하는 한 법과 정의의 괴리는 극복될 수 없었다.
이 시기에 브로흐, 루카치, 그람시 같은 지식인들이 급속하게 공산당에 접근하고, 프랑크푸르트대학 사회연구소에 모인 폴록이나 호르크하이머 같은 젊은 학자들이 네오 맑스주의적인 관점에서 계몽된 시민사회의 현실을 비판적으로 분석하게 된 배경에는, 폭력적인 국가 권력 앞에 무력한 부르주아 시민문화에 대한 절망이 있었다. 따라서 부르주아적인 권력 쟁탈과는 무관한 ‘정의’를 목표로 한 프롤레타리아 ‘폭력’의 가능성을 논의하여 ‘근대’라는 감옥을 탈출하고자 노력하는 것이 당대 지식인의 급선무가 된 것은 당연한 일이었다. 여기서 벤야민의 폭력론이 나왔다.
3. 소렐과 벤야민의 폭력론

벤야민의 폭력론은 조르주 소렐의 ꡔ폭력론ꡕ(1908)에 근거한다. 소렐은 공포 정치로 변질된 프랑스 대혁명(1789)의 담당자인 부르주아에 의한 국가 권력의 남용과, 노동조합의 총파업을 통해 ‘법’의 지배를 타파하고자 한 프롤레타리아의 폭력을 명확히 구별한다. 즉 부르주아가 혁명적 정치 행동을 야기해도 그것은 ‘법’에 의해 기존의 국가 형태를 온존시키면서 권력을 특권자의 것으로 유지하고자 하는 것에 불과하나, 프롤레타리아의 폭력은 ‘법’을 떠나 어떤 종류의 국가 권력 형태도 용인하지 않고 순수한 아나키를 지향한다고 소렐은 주장했다.
이러한 소렐의 주장 역시 20세기 초엽 프랑스의 위기 상황을 의식한 것이나, 소렐의 폭력론이 나온 지 13년 뒤에 쓰여진 벤야민의 ｢폭력비판론｣은 위에서 설명한 1920년대 독일의 현실적 위기에서 소렐의 논의를 발전시킨 것이다. 소렐의 논의에서 중요한 점은 ‘법’에 의하느냐 아니냐 하는 점이다. 이를 벤야민은 Rechtssetzung이라는 개념으로 부른다. 일본에서는 이를 법차정(法借定)이라고 번역하고 우리나라에서도 이에 따르는 견해가 있으나, 차정이란 우리말 사전에도 나오지 않는 말이니 우리말로 삼기에는 어색하다. 여기서는 반드시 정확한 번역이라고 볼 수 없으나, 편의상 ‘법준거’라는 말로 옮기도록 하자. 벤야민의 주장은 다음과 같다.

법준거에서 폭력의 기능은 아래와 같은 의미에서 이중적이다. 즉 법준거는 폭력을 수단으로 하여 법으로 제정하는 것을 목적으로 추구하나, 목적이 된 것이 법으로 제정된 순간 폭 력을 해고하는 것이 아니라, 도리어 더욱 엄밀한 의미에서 게다가 직접적으로 폭력을―폭력으로부터 자유롭고 독립하는 것이 아니라, 필연적으로 그리고 은밀하게 폭력과 결부되어 있는 목적을 권력의 이름으로 법으로 제정함에 따라―법준거적인 폭력으로 만들게 된다. 법 준거는 권력준거이고, 그 점에서 폭력을 직접 선언하는 행위라고 할 수 있다. 정의가 온전 히 신적인 목적준거의 원리임에 대해 권력은 온전히 신화적인 법준거의 원리이다. Walter Benjamin, Zur Kritik der Gewalt, in: Angelus Novus=Ausgewälte Schriften 2, 1966 Frankfurte a. M. (Shurkamp), S. 61.


벤야민은 자기 목적화 되지 않는 폭력의 최종 도달 목표인 ‘정의’와, 일단 준거되어 폭력적인 ‘권력’ 행사의 근거로 변한 ‘법’을 구별한다. 이는 영어와 프랑스어에서 정의를 뜻하는 justice가 라틴어의 ius에서 파생된 말인 것과 달리 독일어에서는 각각 Gerechtigkeit와 Recht가 구별되는 점에서 그 근거를 찾을 수 있다.
벤야민에 의하면 법은 권력자의 ‘법 이전 특권’(Vor-recht)을 유지하기 위해 그 권력이 미치는 경계선을 정하고 고정화한다. 그리고 그 경계선을 침범하는 자를 범죄자로 보고 속죄를 요구한다. 이를 벤야민은 신화적인 법이 지배하는 세계로 본다. 그 세계에서 법=권리의 주체인 각자는 시원적인 폭력을 통해 준거된 법의 경계선 안에 머물도록 강요된다고 벤야민은 주장한다.
벤야민은 이러한 법적 폭력을 법 수호적 폭력(기존의 법을 유지하기 위한 폭력)과 법 형성적 폭력(새로운 법을 제기하는 폭력)으로 구분하면서도 그 둘 모두 법에 의한 지배를 전제함으로써 지배 권력관계를 재생산하는 신화적 폭력에 불과하다고 비판한다. 여기서 신화적이란 법을 변화시킴에 의해 지배 권력관계를 변화시킬 수 있다고 믿기 때문에 붙여진 것이다.
이 두 가지 개념은 법에서 흔히 실정법과 자연법으로 구분하는 것에 각각 대응된다. 즉 벤야민은 실정법과 자연법에서 폭력의 개념이 모두 정당한 목적과 수단의 관계라는 도그마를 공유한다고 비판하고, 시인된 합법적 폭력과 시인되지 않은 불법적 폭력의 구별이 법과 관련된 폭력성을 간과한다고 비판하는 것이다.
반면 벤야민이 신적 폭력이라고 부르는 것은 법과의 연관을 부정하는 혁명적 폭력으로서, 법적 폭력-신화적 폭력을 폐기하기 위한 것이다. 즉 법의 경계선을 파괴하고 ‘법권력’ 하에서의 죄를 제거하기 위한 폭력이다. 파괴적인 작용을 결과한다는 점에서 신적 폭력도 신화적 폭력과 유사하나, 전자가 파괴적인 것은 오직 재화, 법=권리, 생활과 같은 외적 사항과 관련되고, 생명 있는 것의 영혼을 파괴하는 경우는 절대로 없다고 벤야민은 주장한다. 즉 신적인 폭력은 희생의 피를 흐르게 하지 않는다고 한다. 이러한 대립을 벤야민은 다음과 같이 설명한다.

모든 영역에서 신화에 신이 대립하듯이, 신화적 폭력에는 신적인 폭력이 대립한다. 게다가 모든 점에서 대립한다. 신화적 폭력이 법에 준거하는 것이라면 신적 폭력은 법을 파괴한다. 전자가 경계를 설정한다면 후자는 한계를 인정하지 않는다. 전자가 죄를 만들고 속죄하게 하는 것이라면 후자는 죄를 제거한다. 전자가 협박적이라면 후자는 충격적이고, 전자가 피의 냄새를 풍긴다면 후자는 피의 냄새가 없고 치명적이다. 위의 글, S. 63.


이러한 신적인 폭력이 구체적으로 어떤 것인지는 신화적 폭력과 달리 명확하지 않다. 벤야민 자신은 그런 신적인 폭력의 보기로서 ｢폭력비판론｣의 마지막에 구약성경의 예를 들고 있다. 즉 민수기(民數記)의 전설에 나오는 신의 심판이다. 그것은 예고도 협박도 없이 특권자인 제사장(레비) 무리에게 퍼부어져 그들을 섬멸시키는 심판이다.
따라서 이는 실재하는 것이 아니라, 부패한 법과 결별한 정의를 긍정하기 위하여 논리적으로 요청되는 어떤 것에 불과하다고 볼 수도 있다. 게다가 문제는 신적 폭력이 목적과 수단이라는 관계를 면제받는 순수 폭력이라는 보증은 어디에도 없다는 점이다. 이를 데리다도 ꡔꡔ법의 힘ꡕ에서 비판한다. 즉 그에 의하면 벤야민은 법을 창설하는 ‘힘의 일격’이라는 것의 근거 없음을 폭로하여 법을 탈구축하면서도 다시 탈구축할 수 없는 정의를 내세워 법과의 구분을 시도했으나, 그 정의란 것이 다른 법으로 타락하지 않을 보장은 어디에도 없다는 것이다. 다시 말하자면 신적 폭력이라고 하는 것도 언제나 신화적 폭력으로 변할 가능성이 있다는 것이다.
벤야민은 그가 말한 신화적 폭력에 의해 근대 초월을 목표로 한 나치스가 집권하여 망명하지 않으면 안되게 되어서도 프롤레타리아를 주체로 하는 비권력적인 신적 폭력에 의한 폭력혁명의 가능성을 버리지 않았다. 그래서 그는 ｢복제기술시대의 예술작품｣(1936)의 마지막에서 나치즘에 의한 정치의 ‘미학-감성화’에 대해 프롤레타리아는 그와 반대로 미학의 정치화에 의해 응하리라고 낙관했다.
그러나 현실의 역사는 반대였고, 결국 벤야민은 현실에 대한 비관 끝에 자살했다. 그런데 여기서 문제는 벤야민이 그 의도와는 전혀 거꾸로 그가 반대한 나치스의 이데올로기에 접근했다고 하는 아이러니한 점이다. 즉 나치스에 의해 폭력에 의해 계몽화된 시민사회의 법질서를 근본으로부터 파괴하고자 하는 혁명적-메시아적 근본주의가 점증하는 가운데 벤야민의 주장은 나치스의 주장, 특히 칼 슈미트의 정치신학과 결과적으로는 일치되었다는 사실이다. 또한 그가 주장한 신적 폭력으로서의 프롤레타리아 폭력 혁명도 이미 1930년대에 스탈린주의에 의해 그 허구성 역시 명백히 드러났다고 하는 사실도 우리는 부정할 수 없다.


4. 데리다의 폭력론

1989년은 프랑스 대혁명 200주년을 맞은 해였다. 그 해 데리다가 미국에서 행한 ｢법에서 정의로｣라는 강연과, 이듬해 발표한 ｢벤야민의 이름｣이라는 논문을 합쳐 발표된 책이 데리다의 ꡔ법의 힘ꡕ(1994)이었다. 1989년 프랑스는 1921년 독일의 벤야민처럼 권력으로 변질되지 않은 순수한 폭력을 논의하기에는 그 역사적 상황이 너무 달랐다. 당시 2세기에 걸친 프랑스 혁명의 성과가 요란하게 축하되었으나, 혁명이 초래한 두 가지 정치 형태인 자유주의와 사회주의, 특히 사회주의가 패배한 시점이었다. 즉 벤야민이 주장한 프롤레타리아의 순수한 폭력에 의해 비권력적인 최종의 해방을 목표로 삼았어야 할 사회주의 국가는 부르주아 국가 이상으로 자신에게 권력을 집중시킨 결과, 당시 폴란드에서 보듯이 노동조합 총파업 등을 통한 프롤레타리아 법질서가 붕괴되었다. 게다가 데리다의 첫 강연이 있고 난 직후 베를린장벽이 붕괴되었다.
이러한 상황에서 데리다는 벤야민을 비판한다. 우선 그는 벤야민이 신화적 폭력과 신적 폭력을 구별함은 그리스적인 것과 유태적인 것의 이분법에 대응하고, 벤야민의 관점은 유태적인 것이라고 본다. 마찬가지로 그런 유태적 관점에 입각한 마르크스와 엥겔스의 ｢공산당선언｣이 그렇듯이 벤야민은 모든 것을 파괴하고자 했으나, 그 파괴 이후 다시금 법준거의 권력으로 타락하는 현상이 나타났다고 데리다는 비판한다.
데리다는 벤야민이 말하는 폭력(Gewalt)이 독일에서는 입법권(gesetzgebende Gewalt), 영적 권위(geistische Gewalt), 국가권력(Staatsgewalt) 등과 같이 권력이나 권위를 뜻함을 지적한다. 데리다에 의하면 기성 법질서에 근거한 권력이 폐기하는 ‘신적 폭력’은 그 폐기를 선언한 그 순간부터 그것을 대신하는 새로운 권력으로 변모한다. 즉 폭력의 선언은 동시에 법준거의 선언이 된다는 것이다.
이처럼 신화적 법권력으로 변한 폭력은 역사 과정 속에서 부패하고 신적인 순수함으로부터 먼 것임을 폭로한다고 데리다는 본다. 벤야민은 법권력으로 준거된 그러한 부패를 극복하기 위해 신적 폭력을 요구하지만, ‘신적’인 것은 기성의 신화적 폭력의 폐기를 선언하는 순간 스스로 신화적인 성격을 갖게 된다고 데리다는 비판한 것이다.
여기서 데리다는 폭력이 나타나는 순간만은 순수하다는 주장을 새롭게 제기한다. 즉 벤야민이 순수한 신적 폭력에 역사적인 희망을 거는 것과 달리, 데리다는 그 순간을 특권화하지 않고 우리가 일상에서 직면하는 법 앞에서의 ‘결단’ 속에서 폭력에 의한 단절의 순간을 보고자 하는 것이다. 특히 데리다는 그 순간에 정의를 향한 일보를 딛게 되나, 동시에 그 순간은 광기를 가져 폭력을 증폭시킬 수도 있음을 경고하면서 그 순수성을 지켜야 한다고 주장한다.
나아가 데리다는 정의를 향한 발걸음에서 시간적으로는 물론 공간적으로도 무한한 타인에 대한 책임이 수반된다고 주장한다. 법을 개혁하고 혁명을 반복해도 법 자체의 근원적인 부정적 성격은 근절되지 않고 정의는 회복 불가능할 정도가 되기 마련이라고 보면서도, 데리다는 타인에 대한 무한한 책임을 갖는 결단을 통해 다시금 정의를 확인하고자 하는 것이다. 그리고 마지막으로 데리다가 말하는 정의란 ‘불가능한 것에 대한 경험’으로 규정된다.
이러한 데리다의 주장은 그의 탈구축 또는 해체와 정치, 윤리, 법의 관계를 논의한 것으로 주목된다. 그러나 ‘탈구축이 정의이다’라는 그의 결론은 대단히 난해하다. ‘불가능한 것에 대한 경험’은 어떻게 가능하고, 그것을 정의로 삼는 순수한 결단의 폭력이란 어떻게 있을 수 있는가? 그의 논의가 모두 그렇듯이 논리적으로 그 내용을 확정하기란 어렵다. 이상의 주장에서도 그가 구체적으로 무엇을 말하는지 판단하기는 쉽지 않다. 분명한 점은 그가 벤야민의 메시아주의를 비판하면서도 벤야민식의 메시아주의에서 그리 크게 벗어나지 못하고 있다는 점이다.
물론 논리 이전의 심정적 또는 상황적 동감을 부정할 수 없는 점은 사실이다. 특히 벤야민의 ｢폭력비판론｣이 1968년 범세계적인 학생운동에서 경전처럼 읽힌 점, 또한 데리다의 폭력론 역시 그 경험에서 비롯되었다는 점은 분명하다. 또한 그 전후의 모든 사회적 저항에서 그들의 주장이 정당화되는 것도 어렵지 않게 볼 수 있다. 우리나라에서도 광주민중저항을 비롯한 저항운동에서 그들의 주장은 충분히 원용될 수 있다.
특히 데리다의 논의 중에서 마지막으로 주목할 필요가 있는 것은, 서구 근대의 이성이라고 하는 것도 사실은 비이성적인 폭력에 의해 행사되었다고 지적하는 점이다. 데리다는 이를 ‘국내 식민지주의’라고 한다. 데리다에 의하면 그것은 언어에 의해 강요된 폭력이다.

주지하듯이 과거에도 현재에도 대부분의 나라에서 법이나 국가법을 수립하는 폭력은, 국가에 의해 재편성된 소수 민족 또는 소수 종족에 하나의 언어를 강제하는 것에 있다. 프랑스에서 이 사태는 적어도 두 가지 경우에 생겼다. 그 최초의 것은 1539년의 왕령이 사법과 행정 용어로 불어를 강제하고 라틴어를 금지함에 의해 군주제 국가를 통합한 것이 었다. 이어 두 번째로 중요한 것은 프랑스혁명이었다. 당시 언어의 통일은 가장 억압적인 교육상의 전환을 초래했다. Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," in Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, New York, 1992, p. 21.


데리다는 ‘법에 있어서, 그리고 법에 관한 두 종류의 폭력’을 구별한다. 즉 ‘법을 수립하는 폭력, 곧 법을 제정하고 배치하는 폭력과, 법을 유지하는 폭력, 곧 법의 영속력과 강제력을 유지하고 확정하며 보증하는 폭력’이다. 위의 책, p. 31.
이는 어디에서나 볼 수 있는 근대성 역사의 특징이다. 제3 세계에서도 제1 유형의 폭력―수립하는 폭력―이 제2 유형의 폭력에 대한 제3 세계 민중의 관계에 의해 대부분 결정되고 있는 것은 쉽게 발견된다. 문제는 그러한 폭력이 식민 종주국에서는 ‘국내 식민지주의’로 나타나도 근대화를 뜻했으나 식민지에서는 반드시 그렇지 못했다고 하는 점이다. 예컨대 제3세계에서는 여전히 국가 기구의 법적 강제인 경찰에 의해 고문이 가해지고 있다.
이러한 현실에서 근대적 역사관은 실패한다. 따라서 유일한 방법은 피억압자로부터 배우는 것이 된다. 물론 근대적 역사관이 무조건 잘못된 것은 아니다. 예컨대 분배에 관한 정의의 관념 그 자체가 필요하다는 것은 시민, 민주주의, 복지를 둘러싼 근대적 개념이 모든 계급―특히 피억압 계급―에 가능하도록 하기 위한 전제 조건이다. 그러나 그러한 역사관이 진정으로 피억압자의 대화에서 생겨난 것인지는 의문이다. 대화는 목적론적이어서는 안 된다. 즉 어떤 정치적 이데올로기가 선험적으로 옳다는 것을 전제해서는 안 된다.
극단적으로 피억압자가 혁명에 이르게 되는 경우라도 그들이 그 혁명에 필요한 것들을 충분히 이해했다고는 할 수 없다. 그람시는 그 점을 인정하고서 피억압자는 혁명적 지식인을 필요로 한다고 주장했다.

피억압 계급은 스스로가 <국가>로 되기까지 통일되어 있지 않고 통일될 수도 없다. 그 역사는 필연적으로 단편화되고 있는 삽화풍이다. 이러한 집단의 역사적 활동에는 (적어도 어느 정도 잠정적 단계의) 통일에의 경향이 확실히 존재한다. 그러나 이 경향은 지배자 집단의 활동에 의해 끊임없이 중단된다. 실제로 승리하는 것처럼 보이는 경우에도 피억압집단은 자신들을 방위하고자 급급하는 것에 불과하다. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, New York, 1971, pp. 52, 54-55.

우리는 국가에 의해 구조화된 사회에 살고 있고 피억압자는 그 현실과 결부된 지식 형태를 필요로 하고 있다. 여기서 새로운 지식 형태는 국가나 정부, 전체와 결부된 것이어서는 안 된다. 즉 계몽적 합리주의의 유산과는 결별하는 것이어야 한다. 결국 데리다의 논의는 지식인 논의로 나아간다.


5. 파농의 폭력론

이상은 서구에서의 폭력론에 대한 검토이다. 우리는 식민지 차원의 폭력론으로 파농의 그것을 검토할 필요가 있다. 파농은 식민지화란 어떤 땅에 대포와 기계의 힘으로 침략해온 타종족이 그 원주민을 지배하여 토지와 인간을 사유화하는 폭력이라고 규정한다. 그리고 식민지 사회란 포식과 기아로 분할된 사회, 곧 그 경계가 경찰과 군대에 의해 직접 유지되는 인종차별적인 폭력 사회라고 규정한다. 그곳에서 원주민은 절대악이고, 반가치이며, 동물이나 물건에 가까운 수동적인 존재, 요컨대 비인간적인 것으로 식민자에 의해 조작된 대상이다. 이러한 식민지화 역사의 배후에, 식민지 사회 구조의 근본에는 식민자=타자의 폭력이 있다.
이러한 상황에서 인간을 해방하고 그 주체성을 회복시키기 위해서는 식민지 체제를 타도해야 한다고 파농은 주장한다. 즉 비식민지화란 폭력 현상이고 인간 종족의 교대를 뜻한다. 즉 식민지화 역사를 통하여 심신이 모두 억제되고 고통당하며 동물화 되고 사물화된 원주민이 자신의 비인간성에 눈을 떠서, 내면에 저장된 폭력(내면화된 타자의 폭력)을 공격성(반대 폭력)으로 반전시키는 운동이 비식민지화 운동이라고 파농은 주장한다.
요컨대 폭력이 폭력을 낳는 것이고, 그런 의미에서 비식민지화 과정은 식민지화 과정 속에 이미 잠재적으로 존재하며, 그것은 역사의 필연적인 과정이 된다고 파농은 말한다. 그에 의하면 식민지주의는 생각하는 기계도 아니고, 이성을 부여받은 육체도 아니다. 그것은 있는 그대로의 상태에서의 폭력으로서, 그것 이상으로 ‘더욱 큰 폭력’에 의해서만 굴복하는 것이다.
여기서 문제는 ‘더욱 큰 폭력’을 구현하고 인수하며 담당하는 주체가 누구인가 하는 것이다. 파농은 먼저 식민지 시대에는 정당, 지식인, 상인 등이 일정한 역할을 수행하나, 참으로 혁명적인 폭력을 구현하는 자는 농민뿐이라고 말한다. 그리고 다음의 해방 투쟁기에는 도시에서 산골로 도망간 지식인과 소수의 활동가가 농민을 만남에 의해 인민의 의식이 전진한다고 본다. 이어 봉기가 폭발하면 도시 주변부에 집결하는 룸펜 프롤레타리아를 통하여 그것은 확대된다고 주장한다.
파농은 식민지 사회에서 도시 프롤레타리아, 기술자, 관리 등은 특권층으로서, 식민지주의와 타협하여 비폭력을 주장한다고 본다. 이에 대해 농민대중, 그리고 토지를 수탈당하여 도시주변을 방황하는 부랑자, 범죄자, 실업자들이 식민지주의의 이익으로부터 제외되어 더 이상 잃을 것이 없는 존재라고 본다. 그들만이 비타협적이고, 오직 폭력만이 필요하다는 것을 알기 때문이라는 것이다.
그러나 파농은 비식민지화 운동을 단순히 인간 종족의 교대로만 본 것은 아니다. 이 운동이 동시에 ‘새로운 인간의 창조’라는 것, 존재의 ‘근본적인 변경’이라는 것, 곧 가치 과정이라고 주장했다. 그런데 우리는 그것이 어떤 이념이나 추상의 차원이 아니라 ‘대지에 저주받은 자들’이 비식민지화 운동을 통하여 형성하는 역사적인 존재라는 것을 주의해야 한다. 비식민화 운동이 폭력현상인 바 그 존재는 또한 폭력적 존재이기도 하다.
파농에 의하면 실제로 ‘새로운 인간’은 먼저 ‘식민지화된 신체’로 제출된다. 바로 굶주리고 억눌린 존재로서이다. 그러한 존재는 하루아침에 눈을 뜨는 것이 아니다. 식민지에 대한 최초의 반응은 싸움과 범죄 및 부족 항쟁으로, 또한 원시적 종교와 마술에 대한 신앙 및 집단무용으로 나타난다. 억압이 강하면 강할수록 억압에 대한 눈뜸은 늦어지고 장기화된다.
파농과 달리 혁명 이론가들은 그러한 타락과 일탈 및 후퇴를 직시하지 않고 자각은 직선적으로 달성된다고들 했다. 그러나 파농은 종교도 주술도 ‘아편’으로 보지 않고 몽상도 광기도 부정적인 요인으로 배척하지 않았다. 도리어 그는 이 모든 것을 폭력의 과정으로, 반대 폭력에 대한 성숙으로 ‘새로운 인간의 창조’를 향한 최초의 단계, 곧 ‘폭력의 분위기’로 보았다. 파농에 의하면 이러한 ‘폭력의 분위기’는 차차 ‘행동화한 폭력’으로 나아간다. 그 계기는 식민지의 탄압이다. 여기서 폭력은 신체의 긴장과 이완, 집단 무용이나 축제로는 처리될 수 없다. 먹느냐 먹히느냐가 지배하는 반란의 초기 단계에 신체상 중요한 것은 노동이다. 그러나 여기서 노동이란 생산 노동을 뜻하지 않는다. 왜냐하면 그것은 식민지체제에 협력하는 것이기 때문이다. 도리어 태만이야말로 비협력이자, 저항으로 평가된다. 반대로 원주민에게 가치 있는 노동이란 식민주의를 타도하는 노동이다.
파농은 말한다. ‘새로운 인간’, 곧 ‘완전한 인간’은 근육과 두뇌를 분리시키지 않고 노동 속에서 양자를 통일하는 인간이고, 능률과 효율이 아니라 자기 신체와 두뇌의 리듬에 따라 노동하는 인간이다. 그리고 도구나 기술에 지배당하는 것을 거부하고 자신이 받아들이는 목적에 따라서만 도구나 기술을 사용하는 인간이다. 또한 일-행동의 계획으로부터 실현에 이르는 모든 과정에 타인과 함께 의식적으로 참가하고 그 의미를 명확하게 파악하고 있는 인간이다. 그리고 자율적인 공동체의 자율적인 구성원으로서 타인에 대한 겸양, 배려, 사랑을 소중하게 생각하고 동료와의 협력이나 의사소통에 가치를 두는 인간이다. 나아가 타자-타민족의 착취와 지배를 거부하고 타자-타민족과의 공생을 원리로 삼는 인간이다. 이러한 새로운 인간상이 자본주의는 물론 사회주의에서도 불가능함은 두말할 필요도 없다. 자율적인 공동체와 완전한 인간의 미래는 그 어느 것도 아닌 제3 세계에서만 가능하다고 파농은 믿었다. 그러나 우리는 이러한 파농의 희망 역시 제3 세계에서 과연 현실적으로 구현되었는지 의심할 수 있다.
6. 아렌트의 폭력론

아렌트는 유럽과 달리 정당한 법의 근거를 폭력을 비롯한 다른 것에서 구하려는 전통이 없는 미국을 통해 위에서 지적한 소렐, 벤야민, 데리다, 파농을 비판하면서 나름의 해결을 강구하고자 한다. 따라서 언뜻 보면 아렌트는 소렐 등이 말한 저항폭력을 부정하고, 그들이 국가폭력이라고 한 권력을 긍정하는 것처럼 보인다. 이러한 주장은 그녀의 ꡔ폭력론ꡕ(1970)에서 중점적으로 제기되고 있으나, 그것을 제대로 이해하기 위해서는 ꡔ인간의 조건ꡕ(1958)을 비롯한 그녀의 정치사상 전반에 대한 종합적인 검토가 필요하다.
먼저 ꡔ폭력론ꡕ에서 그녀는 폭력은 권력과 대립한다는 전통적인 주장을 전제한다. 그녀에 의하면 폭력은 목적을 이루기 위한 수단이나, 권력은 사람들이 함께 모여 토론하고 행동하여 생기는 것으로 그 자체가 정당성을 갖는다. 따라서 권력이 폭력을 사용하면 이미 권력이 아니고 정당성도 없다. 그녀에 의하면 소렐 이후 폭력론이 등장한 것은 근대 사회의 이성이나 진보라는 획일화에 의해 토론과 행동을 통한 공공권이 소멸되었기 때문이다.
그녀는 미국을 그러한 근대적 전통에서 해방된 개인, 그 개인이 자유로운 의사를 서로 표명할 수 있는 공적 생활에 기초를 둔 공화제의 원리로 체현한 나라로 본다. 물론 그녀는 미국에도 많은 소수 인종에 대한 차별을 당연히 인정하나, 이는 자유의 영역인 정치=공공권과는 무관한 사회의 영역으로 본다.
아렌트는 ꡔ인간의 조건ꡕ에서 그런 정치의 이상을 고대 그리스에서 생긴 공공권에서 발견한다. 그녀가 말하는 공공권이란 생물적 욕구로부터 해방된 자유로운 사람들이 언론과 설득에 의해 자유롭게 활동하는 공간을 뜻한다. 반면 가정이라는 사적 영역에서 가계가 추구되었다고 본다. 그런데 근대 국가에 와서 가계가 가정을 뛰어넘어 국가의 관심사가 되어 사회적 영역이 나타났고, 인종차별과 같은 폭력은 그런 영역에서 문제된다고 아렌트는 본다.
아렌트는 근대 시민혁명의 두 가지인 1776년의 미국 독립 혁명과 프랑스 대혁명을 본질적으로 다른 것으로 본다. 그녀는 우리가 말하는 자유를 Liberation, 즉 물질적으로 결핍된 상태나 물리적으로 억압된 상태로부터의 해방을 뜻하는 소극적 개념과, Freedom, 즉 자신의 정신적 활동의 단서를 스스로 만들고 인간으로서의 존재를 스스로 형성해 가는 능동적인 개념으로 구별한다. 고대 그리스에서는 Freedom이 중심이었으나, 근대 국가에서는 Liberation이 중심이 되었고, 이는 맑스를 거쳐 사회주의 혁명에까지 이어졌다는 것이다.
아렌트가 말하는 전체주의는 나치즘이나 스탈린주의에 그치는 것이 아니라, 19-20세기 질서를 묘사하는 개념으로 사용된다. 그녀가 말하는 19세기 서구형 국민 국가는 자본주의를 강력히 추진하여 제국주의적 팽창을 결과했다. 그것은 또한 인종주의와 결탁하여 ‘피와 땅의 공동체’로 변질되어 반유태주의를 격화시켰고, 마찬가지로 제국 사이의 대립도 격화시켜 제1차대전을 낳았다. 그 후 20세기는 경찰 조직과 강제수용소를 통해, ‘국민’의 인종화와 전쟁에 의해 대량 생산된 무국적자=무권리자를 국민에서 배제했다.
아렌트에 의하면 프랑스 대혁명 시 로베스피에르의 공포 정치는 자유로운 활동을 가능하게 하는 사람들 사이를 무시하고 개인의 마음 속 문제인 동정을 통일적 원리로 삼아 인간을 일반의지를 갖는 공동체로 조직하려고 한 시도였다. 그녀는 이러한 ‘동정에의 열광’에 근거한 정치가 폭력적 충동을 인간의 자연적 본능으로 보아 인민을 하나의 육체처럼 움직이고 하나의 의지를 갖는 것처럼 행위하는 영혼으로 변모시켰다고 본다. 어떤 이성적 제약도 받지 않는 이 육체는 스스로에게 동화할 수 없는 것을 폭력에 의해 파괴했다는 것이다.
이처럼 폴리스적인 자유와는 상용될 수 없는 자연적 폭력을 해방시킨 프랑스 혁명에 반해 미국 혁명은 ‘자유의 창설’이라는 본래 목적을 잃지 않고 계속 추구했다고 아렌트는 주장한다. 그녀에 의하면 미국에도 빈민은 존재했으나 프랑스나 독일처럼 비참하지는 않았고, 경제적 격차는 정치가 아니라 사회 문제로 여겨져 빈곤으로부터의 해방 요구에 의해 혁명의 방향이 결정되거나 변질되지 않았다. 노동자들의 관심도 빈곤으로부터의 해방이 아니라 자유의 창설에 대한 참여였다는 것이다.
아렌트에 의하면 미국에서도 인민(people)은 존재했으나, 그것은 프랑스처럼 자연적 충동에 의해 하나의 의지를 갖는 육체처럼 행동하는 것이 아니라, 복수성을 보증하는 자유로운 결합체를 의미했다. 이는 제퍼슨이나 매디슨 같은 초기 대통령들이 정치적 자유의 본질을 복수성에서 구한 것에 알 수 있다고 아렌트는 주장한다. 즉 그들은 상이한 의견을 갖는 사람들 사이의 교환이 있음으로 비로소 상대를 변론에 의해 설득하고자 하는 활동의 계기가 생긴다고 보았다는 것이다. 프랑스에서와 같이 일반의지가 지배하는 여론에는 다양성이 포함될 여지가 없으나, 미국 공화제에서는 처음부터 전원일치의 허구가 거부되고 서로의 논의를 통해 개인적인 이성의 잘못을 교정하면서 공공생활권을 세우는 것을 목표로 삼았다는 것이 아렌트의 주장이다. 즉 상이한 의견의 당파에 의해 구성되는 것이 미국 통치형태의 특징이라고 아렌트는 주장한다.
아렌트는 자신의 자유로운 활동이 아니라 자신과 다른 존재에 의해 형이상학적으로 근거되는 삶의 방식을 인간성에 반하는 것으로 거부한다. 그녀에 의하면 형이상학적 원리에 의해 일원적으로 지배되는 세계에는 복수성에 근거한 인간성을 발전시킬 수 있는 여지가 없다. 따라서 종교적, 초월적 권위에 의해 외부로부터 정당화된 중세 기독교 세계의 통치체제는 인간성에 반한다고 주장한다.
그래서 아렌트는 근대 혁명 속에서 탈형이상학적, 세속적인 정치권력 창설의 계기를 발견하고자 한다. 그러나 현실 혁명은 그런 것이 아니었다. 자기 통치의 근거를 자신이 창설한 자유가 아니라, 어떤 형태의 신적인 원리에서 구한 혁명 전권은 형이상학에 빠져 자유로운 활동을 위한 공간을 스스로 파괴했기 때문이었다. 그래서 ‘일반의지’의 표현이라는 여론에 의해 자기 통치를 신성화하고자 한 로베스피에르를 비롯한 혁명가는 좌절했다고 아렌트는 분석한다. 즉 앙시앙 레짐의 절대군주제로부터 자기를 해방하고자 한 그들은 절대군주를 대신하는 새로운 절대자를 실체적으로 창출하고자 했다는 것이다.
그러나 아렌트에 의하면 식민지 미국에서는 그 지배자인 영국에서 절대군주제가 없어졌고 ‘법에 의해 제한된’ 군주제가 있었던 탓으로 미국인들은 ‘법을 초월한 절대적 지배자’라는 환상에 빠지지 않았다. 반면 더욱 강력한 권위를 갖는 절대자를 인민에게 구한 프랑스에서는 자신의 절대성과 동화될 수 없는 것을 파괴하고자 하는 ‘정치 이전의 자연적 폭력’으로 변질되었다. 인민이라는 이름으로 절대화된 군중의 폭력은 절대군주제를 붕괴시켰으나, 동시에 같은 폭력에 의해 혁명 정부 자체가 파괴되었다는 것이다.
아렌트는 정치에서 절대자가 담당하는 기능을 다음 둘로 본다. 하나는 인간에 의한 법제정을 둘러싼 악순환이고, 다른 하나는 새로운 시작이라고 하는 악순환이다. 첫째는 입법의 타당성과 합법성을 외부, 즉 ‘더욱 고차원의 법’에서 구하는 것으로서 인위적인 법을 언제나 다른 권위에서 구하는 악순환이다. 그러나 그것은 언제나 불완전하므로 결국은 자신의 이름으로 둘째의 새로운 시작을 선언하게 된다. 즉 인민의 이름으로이다. 이는 바로 앞에서 본 소렐이나 벤야민 또는 데리다까지의 ‘신화적 폭력’이라는 문제의식이었다.
아렌트는 혁명에서 절대자는, 이러한 두 가지 악순환을 회피하여 합법적인 통치체제를 수립하고자 하는 경우 논리적으로 요구된다고 본다. 즉 근대초의 절대군주제는 중세 기독교 세계의 신적인 합법성을 차단하고 세속 권력을 수립하고자 하여 생긴 것으로 중세적 권위의 잔재인 것은 아니라는 것이다. 한편 프랑스 혁명에서는 절대군주제 대신 군중=인민이 절대자로 나타났다. 이는 법에 구속되지 않는 자연적 폭력을 해방시켰다.
반면 미국에서는 인민이 권력의 담당자로 여겨졌으나 법의 원천으로 여겨지지는 않았다고 아렌트는 주장한다. 대신 법은 풀뿌리 차원의 인민의 의지를 넘는 초월적이고 보편적인 것으로 여겨졌고, 그 법은 고정된 것이 아니라 혁명 과정과 함께 갱신되는 것으로 여겨졌다는 것이다. 즉 Freedom의 영역을 새로이 창설하고자 하는 혁명운동의 과정이 법의 원천이고 ‘보다 높은 법’은 언제나 생성되는 것이었다. 아렌트에 의하면 실체화되지 않고 언제나 자기생산을 계속하는 법이 ‘인민에 의한 통치’를 구속하고, ‘정치 이전의 폭력’을 봉쇄하는 메커니즘이 생김에 의해 미국 혁명은 절대자를 둘러싼 세속화된 형이상학에 빠지지 않았다. 즉 절대자가 실체적으로 표상화되지 않았기에 권력이 폭력으로 변하지 않았다는 것이다.
이렌트가 말하는 역사의 새로운 시작은 역사를 초월한 절대자에 의한 것이 아니라, ‘창설’하는 ‘행위’ 그 자체 속에 있다. 즉 행위가 절대이지 주체가 절대이지 않았다는 것이다. 앞에서 본 소렐-벤야민-데리다의 문제는 아렌트에 와서 자신의 창설 행위 자체를 절대적인 것으로 보는 미국 혁명에서 해답을 보이게 된다. 아렌트는 ꡔ공화국의 위기ꡕ(1972)에서 미국 헌법의 기본으로 시민적 불복종을 다루었다. 즉 그것은 위법적 폭력행위가 아니라 헌법 옹호의 행위로서 합법화된 것이었다. 여기서 폭력론은 시민적 불복종의 논의로 나아간다.


7. 맺음말

지금까지 소렐, 벤야민, 데리다, 파농의 저항적 폭력론과 그것에 비판적인 아렌트의 폭력론을 살펴보았다. 그것들은 나름대로의 현실 상황에서 생겨난 논의들로 이해할 필요가 있는 것이지 어떤 주장이 반드시 옳고 그르다고 재단할 필요는 없을 것이나, 필자의 입장은 아렌트의 주장에 가깝다. 여하튼 위에서 언급하지 않은 한 두 가지를 더하면서 이 글을 맺고자 한다.
하나는 국민형성의 폭력적 구조 문제이다. 근대사에서 국민형성의 폭력이란 ‘국민’이 ‘되는’ 과정을 말하는 것으로, 전쟁에서 가장 현저하게 나타난다. 여기서 주의할 점은 전쟁이 비상사태가 아니라 평범한 일상생활과 관련된다고 하는 점이다. ‘전시동원’이란 신체의 동원으로서 생활의 규율화를 통해 가능하고, 생활 규율로부터 군사 규율이 만들어진다. 이러한 군사 규율은 생활 규율로 다시 내면화된다. 우리는 그러한 폭력적 구조를 식민지 시대와 군사독재 시대에 경험했고, 그러한 구조는 분단에 의한 냉전 의식이 여전히 팽배한 지금도 상당 부분 온존되고 있다.
이러한 생활 구조적인 폭력성은 특히 성의 측면에서 나타난다. 근대 국가가 성을 제도로써 통제하고자 한 것은 단순히 전시성 성폭력인 ‘종군위안부’ 문제에만 그치는 것이 아니다. 그것은 전쟁 이전부터 소위 ‘훌륭한 국민’을 재생산하기 위한 성과 생식의 통제를 가한 것의 연장이기 때문이다. ‘현모양처’와 ‘종군위안부’라는 여성에 대한 이중 기준이 남성에 의해 이용되어 성폭력은 모든 국민에게 작용했다. 이러한 이중 기준은 식민지 전쟁과 6.25 전쟁이 끝난 후에는 물론, 지금까지도 그대로 유지되고 있다. 식민지의 경우 가해자 일본만이 아니라 피해자 조선-한국에도 그대로 유지되고 있다. 뿐만 아니라 일본의 그것은 서양의 선진 자본주의 국가의 제도를 모방하여 발전시킨 것으로서, 서양에서도 식민지에서 더욱 가혹한 형태를 취했다. 그 근본인 경제의 논리와 민족 차별의 논리는 성 차별에도 그대로 관철되었으며, 일본의 그것은 서양식 성 관리 정책에 다름이 아니었고, 그 유습이 우리나라에도 그대로 유지되었다. 이러한 성에 대한 폭력적 구조는 노동, 사상, 교육 등등 국민형성의 모든 요소 속에 동일하게 유지되어 이미 기성의 신화로 자리 잡고 있다. 그러한 신화적 폭력에 대항하는 저항적 폭력, 벤야민이나 데리다 또는 파농이 말하는 신적 폭력 또는 결단적 폭력 등은 우리에게 어떻게 가능할 것인가? 그것도 다시금 신화적 폭력으로 변질되지 않고 그 순수성을 어떻게 가질 수 있을 것인가? 또는 그 대안으로 아렌트가 말하는 폭력과 대치되는, 토론과 행동의 권력을 어떻게 확보할 수 있을 것인가?

 

원문 : http://jbreview.jinbo.net/maynews/readview.php?table=organ&item=&no=401

II. Pleasure in Looking/Fascination with the Human Form

 

A. The cinema offers a number of possible pleasures. One is scopophilia. There are circumstances in which looking itself is a source of pleasure, just as, in the reverse formation, there is pleasure in being looked at. Originally. in his Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud isolated scopophilia as one of the component instincts of sexuality which exist as drives quite independently of the erotogenic zones. At this point he associated scopophilia with taking other people as objects, subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze. His particular examples center around the voyeuristic activities of children, their desire to see and make sure of the private and the forbidden (curiosity about other people's genital and bodily functions, about the presence or absence of the penis and, retrospectively, about the primal scene). In this analysis scopophilia is essentially active. (Later, in Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Freud developed his theory of scopophilia further, attaching it initially to pre-genital auto-eroticism, after which the pleasure of the look is transferred to others by analogy. There is a close working here of the relationship between the active instinct and its further development in a narcissistic form.) Although the instinct is modified by other factors, in particular the constitution of the ego, it continues to exist as the erotic basis for pleasure in looking at another person as object. At the extreme, it can become fixated into a perversion, producing obsessive voyeurs and Peeping Toms, whose only sexual satisfaction can come from watching, in an active controlling sense, an objectified other.

 

At first glance, the cinema would seem to be remote from the undercover world of the surreptitious observation of an unknowing and unwilling victim. What is seen of the screen is so manifestly shown. But the mass of mainstream film, and the conventions within which it has consciously evolved, portray a hermetically sealed world which unwinds magically, indifferent to the presence of the audience, producing for them a sense of separation and playing on their voyeuristic phantasy. Moreover, the extreme contrast between the darkness in the auditorium (which also isolates the spectators from one another) and the brilliance of the shifting patterns of light and shade on the screen helps to promote the illusion of voyeuristic separation. Although the film is really being shown, is there to be seen, conditions of screening and narrative conventions give the spectator an illusion of looking in on a private world. Among other things, the position of the spectators in the cinema is blatantly one of repression of their exhibitionism and projection of the repressed desire on to the performer.

 

 

B. The cinema satisfies a primordial wish for pleasurable looking, but it also goes further, developing scopophilia in its narcissistic aspect. The conventions of mainstream film focus attention on the human form. Scale, space, stories are all anthropomorphic. Here, curiosity and the wish to look intermingle with a fascination with likeness and recognition: the human face, the human body, the relationship between the human form and its surroundings, the visible presence of the person in the world. Jacques Lacan has described how the moment when a child recognises its own image in the mirror is crucial for the constitution of the ego. Several aspects of this analysis are relevant here. The mirror phase occurs at a time when the child's physical ambitions outstrip his motor capacity, with the result that his recognition of himself is joyous in that he imagines his mirror image to be more complete, more perfect than he experiences his own body. Recognition is thus overlaid with misrecognition: the image recognised is conceived as the reflected body of the self, but its misrecognition as superior projects this body outside itself as an ideal ego, the alienated subject. which, re-introjected as an ego ideal, gives rise to the future generation of identification with others. This mirror-moment predates language for the child.

 

Important for this article is the fact that it is an image that constitutes the matrix of the imaginary, of recognition/misrecognition and identification, and hence of the first articulation of the 'I' of subjectivity. This is a moment when an older fascination with looking (at the mother's face, for an obvious example) collides with the initial inklings of self-awareness. Hence it is the birth of the long love affair/despair between image and self-image which has found such intensity of expression in film and such joyous recognition in the cinema audience. Quite apart from the extraneous similarities between screen and mirror (the framing of the human form in its surroundings, for instance), the cinema has structures of fascination strong enough to allow temporary loss of ego while simultaneously reinforcing the ego. The sense of forgetting the world as the ego has subsequently come to perceive it (I forgot who I am and where I was) is nostagically reminiscent of that pre-subjective moment of image recognition. At the same time the cinema has distinguished itself in the pro- duction of ego ideals as expressed in particular in the star system, the stars centering both screen presence and screen story as they act out a complex process of likeness and difference (the glamorous impersonates the ordinary).

 

 

C. Sections II. A and B have set out two contradictory aspects of the pleasurable structures of looking in the conventional cinematic situation. The first, scopophilic, arises from pleasure in using another person as an object of sexual stimulation through sight. The second, developed through narcissism and the constitution of the ego, comes from identification with the image seen. Thus, in film terms, one implies a separation of the erotic identity of the subject from the object on the screen (active scopophilia), the other demands identification of the ego with the object on the screen through the spectator's fascination with and recognition of his like. The first is a function of the sexual instincts, the second of ego libido. This dichotomy was crucial for Freud. Although he saw the two as interacting and overlaying each other, the tension between instinctual drives and self-preservation continues to be a dramatic polarisation in terms of pleasure. Both are formative structures, mechanisms not meaning. In themselves they have no signification, they have to be attached to an idealisation. Both pursue aims in indifference to perceptual reality, creating the imagised, eroticised concept of the world that forms the perception of the subject and makes a mockery of empirical objectivity. During its history, the cinema seems to have evolved a particular illusion of reality in which this contradiction between libido and ego has found a beautifully complementary phantasy world. In reality the phantasy world of the screen is subject to the law which produces it. Sexual instincts and identification processes have a meaning within the symbolic order which articulates desire. Desire, born with language, allows the possibility of transcending the instinctual and the imaginary, but its point of reference continually returns to the traumatic moment of its birth: the castration complex. Hence the look, pleasurable in form, can be threatening in content, and it is woman as representation/image that crystallises this paradox.

 

 

III. Woman as Image, Man as Bearer of the Look

 

 

A. In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female form which is styled accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness. Woman displayed as sexual object is the leit-motif of erotic spectacle: from pin-ups to striptease, from Ziegfeld to Busby Berkeley, she holds the look, plays to and signifies male desire. Mainstream film neatly combined spectacle and narrative. (Note, however, how the musical song-and-dance numbers break the flow of the diegesis.) The presence of woman is an indispensable element of spectacle in normal narrative film, , yet her visual presence tends to work against the development of a story line, to freeze the flow of action in moments of erotic contemplation. This alien presence then has to be integrated into cohesion with the narrative. As Budd Boetticher has put it:

 

"What counts is what the heroine provokes, or rather what she represents. She is the one, or rather the love or fear she inspires in the hero, or else the concern he feels for her, who makes him act the way he does. In herself the woman has not the slightest importance."

 

(A recent tendency in narrative film has been to dispense with this problem altogether; hence the development of what Molly Haskell has called the 'buddy movie,' in which the active homosexual eroticism of the central male figures can carry the story without distraction.) Traditionally, the woman displayed has functioned on two levels: as erotic object for the characters within the screen story, and as erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium, with a shifting tension between the looks on either side of the screen. For instance, the device of the show-girl allows the two looks to be unified technically without any apparent break in the diegesis. A woman performs within the narrative, the gaze of the spectator and that of the male characters in the film are neatly combined without breaking narrative verisimilitude. For a moment the sexual impact of the performing woman takes the film into a no-man's-land outside its own time and space. Thus Marilyn Monroe's first appearance in The River of No Return and Lauren Bacall's songs in To Have or Have Not. Similarly, conventional close-ups of legs (Dietrich, for instance) or a face (Garbo) integrate into the narrative a different mode of eroticism. One part of a fragmented body destroys the Renaissance space, the illusion of depth demanded by the narrative, it gives flatness, the quality of a cut-out or icon rather than verisimilitude to the screen.

 

 

B. An active/passive heterosexual division of labor has similarly controlled narrative structure. According to the principles of the ruling ideology and the psychical structures that back it up, the male figure cannot bear the burden of sexual objectification. Man is reluctant to gaze at his exhibitionist like. Hence the split between spectacle and narrative supports the man's role as the active one of forwarding the story, making things happen. The man controls the film phantasy and also emerges as the representative of power in a further sense: as the bearer of the look of the spectator, transferring it behind the screen to neutralise the extra-diegetic tendencies represented by woman as spectacle. This is made possible through the processes set in motion by structuring the film around a main controlling figure with whom the spectator can identify. As the spectator identifies with the main male protagonist, he projects his look on to that of his like, his screen surrogate, so that the power of the male protagonist as he controls events coincides with the active power of the erotic look, both giving a satisfying sense of omnipotence. A male movie star's glamorous characteristics are thus not those of the erotic object of the gaze, but those of the more perfect, more complete, more powerful ideal ego conceived in the original moment of recognition in front of the mirror. The character in the story can make things happen and control events better than the subject/spectator, just as the image in the mirror was more in control of motor coordination. In contrast to woman as icon, the active male figure (the ego ideal of the identification process) demands a three-dimensional space corresponding to that of the mirror-recognition in which the alienated subject internalised his own representation of this imaginary existence. He is a figure in a landscape. Here the function of film is to reproduce as accurately as possible the so-called natural conditions of human perception. Camera technology (as exemplified by deep focus in particular) and camera movements (determined by the action of the protagonist), combined with invisible editing (demanded by realism) all tend to blur the limits of screen space. The male protagonist is free to command the stage, a stage of spatial illusion in which he articulates the look and creates the action.

 

 

C.1 Sections III, A and B have set out a tension between a mode of representation of woman in film and conventions surrounding the diegesis. Each is associated with a look: that of the spectator in direct scopophilic contact with the female form displayed for his enjoyment (connoting male phantasy) and that of the spectator fascinated with the image of his like set in an illusion of natural space, and through him gaining control and possession of the woman within the diegesis. (This tension and the shift from one pole to the other can structure a single text. Thus both in Only Angels Have Wings and in To Have and Have Not, the film opens with the woman as object the combined gaze of spectator and all the male protagonists in the film. She is isolated, glamorous, on display, sexualised. But as the narrative progresses she falls in love with the main male protagonist and becomes his property, losing her outward glamorous characteristics, her generalised sexuality, her show-girl connotations; her eroticism is subjected to the male star alone. By means of identification with him, through participation in his power, the spectator can indirectly possess her too.)

 

But in psychoanalytic terms, the female figure poses a deeper problem. She also connotes something that the look continually circles around but disavows: her lack of a penis, implying a threat of castration and hence unpleasure. Ultimately, the meaning of woman is sexual difference, the absence of the penis as visually ascertainable, the material evidence on which is based the castration complex essential for the organisation of entrance to the symbolic order and the law of the father. Thus the woman as icon, displayed for the gaze and enjoyment of men, the active controllers of the look, always threatens to evoke the anxiety it originally signified. The male unconscious has two avenues of escape from this castration anxiety: preoccupation with the re-enactment of the original trauma (investigating the woman, demystifying her mystery), counterbalanced by the devaluation, punishment or saving of the guilty object (an avenue typified by the concerns of the film noir); or else complete disavowal of castration by the substitution of a fetish object or turning the represented figure itself into a fetish so that it becomes reassuring rather than dangerous (hence over-valuation, the cult of the female star). This second avenue, fetishistic scopophilia, builds up the physical beauty of the object, transforming it into something satisfying in itself. The first avenue, voyeurism, on the contrary, has associations with sadism: pleasure lies in ascertaining guilt (immediately associated with castration), asserting control and subjecting the guilty person through punishment or forgiveness. This sadistic side fits in well with narrative. Sadism demands a story, depends on making something happen, forcing a change in another person, a battle of will and strength, victory/defeat, all occurring in a linear time with a beginning and an end. Fetishistic scopophilia, on the other hand, can exist outside linear time as the erotic instinct is focused on the look alone. These contradictions and ambiguities can be illustrated more simply by using works by Hitchcock and Sternberg, both of whom take the look almost as the content or subject matter of many of their films. Hitchcock is the more complex, as he uses both mechanisms. Sternberg's work, on the other hand, provides many pure examples of fetishistic scopophilia.

 

 

C.2 It is well known that Sternberg once said he would welcome his films being projected upside down so that story and character involvement would not interfere with the spectator's undiluted appreciation of the screen image. This statement is revealing but ingenuous. Ingenuous in that his films do demand that the figure of the woman (Dietrich, in the cycle of films with her, as the ultimate example) should be identifiable. But revealing in that it emphasises the fact that for him the pictorial space enclosed by the frame is paramount rather than narrative or identification processes. While Hitchcock goes into the investigative side of voyeurism, Sternberg produces the ultimate fetish, taking it to the point where the powerful look of the male protagonist (characteristic of traditional narrative film) is broken in favour of the image in direct erotic rapport with the spectator. The beauty of the woman as object and the screen space coalesce; she is no longer the bearer of guilt but a perfect product, whose body, stylised and fragmented by close-ups, is the content of the film and the direct recipient of the spectator's look. Sternberg plays down the illusion of screen depth; his screen tends to be one-dimensional, as light and shade, lace, steam, foliage, net, streamers, etc, reduce the visual field. There is little or no mediation of the look through the eyes of the main male protagonist. On the contrary, shadowy presences like La Bessiere in Morocco act as surrogates for the director, detached as they are from audience identification. Despite Sternberg's insistence that his stories are irrelevant, it is significant that they are concerned with situation, not suspense, and cyclical rather than linear time, while plot complications revolve around misunderstanding rather than conflict. The most important absence is that of the controlling male gaze within the screen scene. The high point of emotional drama in the most typical Dietrich films, her supreme moments of erotic meaning, take place in the absence of the man she loves in the fiction. There are other witnesses, other spectators watching her on the screen, but their gaze is one with, not standing in for, that of the audience. At the end of Morocco, Tom Brown has already disappeared into the desert when Amy Jolly kicks off her gold sandals and walks after him. At the end of Dishonoured, Kranau is indifferent to the fate of Magda. In both cases, the erotic impact, sanctified by death, is displayed as a spectacle for the audience. The male hero misunderstands and, above all, does not see.

 

In Hitchcock, by contrast, the male hero does see precisely what the audience sees. However, in the films I shall discuss here, he takes fascination with an image through scopophilic eroticism as the subject of the film. Moreover, in these cases the hero portrays the contradictions and tensions experienced by the spectator. In Vertigo in particular, but also in Marnie and Rear Window, the look is central to the plot, oscillating between voyeurism and fetishistic fascination. As a twist, a further manipulation of the normal viewing process which in some sense reveals it, Hitchcock uses the process of identification normally associated with ideological correctness and the recognition of established morality and shows up its perverted side. Hitchcock has never concealed his interest in voyeurism, cinematic and non-cinematic. His heroes are exemplary of the symbolic order and the law-- a policeman (Vertigo), a dominant male possessing money and power (Marnie)--but their erotic drives lead them into compromised situations. The power to subject another person to the will sadistically or to the gaze voyeuristically is turned on to the woman as the object of both. Power is backed by a certainty of legal right and the established guilt of the woman (evoking castration, psychoanalytically speaking). True perversion is barely concealed under a shallow mask of ideological correctness--the man is on the right side of the law, the woman on the wrong. Hitchcock's skillful use of identification processes and liberal use of subjective camera from the point of view of the male protagonist draw the spectators deeply into his position, making them share his uneasy gaze. The audience is absorbed into a voyeuristic situation within the screen scene and diegesis which parodies his own in the cinema. In his analysis of Rear Window, Douchet takes the film as a metaphor for the cinema. Jeffries is the audience, the events in the apartment block opposite correspond to the screen. As he watches, an erotic dimension is added to his look, a central image to the drama. His girlfriend Lisa had been of little sexual interest to him, more or less a drag, so long as she remained on the spectator side. When she crosses the barrier between his room and the block opposite, their relationship is re-born erotically. He does not merely watch her through his lens, as a distant meaningful image, he also sees her as a guilty intruder exposed by a dangerous man threatening her with punishment, and thus finally saves her. Lisa's exhibitionism has already been established by her obsessive interest in dress and style, in being a passive image of visual perfection; Jeffries' voyeurism and activity have also been established through his work as a photo-journalist, a maker of stories and captor of images. However, his enforced inactivity, binding him to his seat as a spectator, puts him squarely in the phantasy position of the cinema audience.

 

In Vertigo, subjective camera predominates. Apart from flash-back from Judy's point of view, the narrative is woven around what Scottie sees or fails to see. The audience follows the growth of his erotic obsession and subsequent despair precisely from his point of view. Scottie's voyeurism is blatant: he falls in love with a woman he follows and spies on without speaking to. Its sadistic side is equally blatant: he has chosen (and freely chosen, for he had been a successful lawyer) to be a policeman, with all the attendant possibilities of pursuit and investigation. As a result. he follows, watches and falls in love with a perfect image of female beauty and mystery. Once he actually confronts her, his erotic drive is to break her down and force her to tell by persistent cross-questioning. Then, in the second part of the film, he re-enacts his obsessive involvement with the image he loved to watch secretly. He reconstructs Judy as Madeleine, forces her to conform in every detail to the actual physical appearance of his fetish. Her exhibitionism, her masochism, make her an ideal passive counterpart to Scottie's active sadistic voyeurism. She knows her part is to perform, and only by playing it through and then replaying it can she keep Scottie's erotic interest. But in the repetition he does break her down and succeeds in exposing her guilt. His curiosity wins through and she is punished. In Vertigo, erotic involvement with the look is disorienting: the spectator's fascination is turned against him as the narrative carries him through and entwines him with the processes that he is himself exercising. The Hitchcock hero here is firmly placed within the symbolic order, in narrative terms. He has all the attributes of the patriarchal super-ego. Hence the spectator, lulled into a false sense of security by the apparent legality of his surrogate, sees through his look and finds himself exposed as complicit, caught in the moral ambiguity of looking.

 

Far from being simply an aside on the perversion of the police, Vertigo focuses on the implications of the active/looking, passive/looked-at split in terms of sexual difference and the power of the male symbolic encapsulated in the hero. Marnie, too, performs for Mark Rutland's gaze and masquerades as the perfect to-be-looked-at image. He, too, is on the side of the law until, drawn in by obsession with her guilt, her secret, he longs to see her in the act of committing a crime, make her confess and thus save her. So he, too, becomes complicit as he acts out the implications of his power. He controls money and words, he can have his cake and eat it.

 

 

III. Summary

 

 

The psychoanalytic background that has been discussed in this article is relevant to the pleasure and unpleasure offered by traditional narrative film. The scopophilic instinct (pleasure in looking at another person as an erotic object), and, in contradistinction, ego libido (forming identification processes) act as formations, mechanisms, which this cinema has played on. The image of woman as (passive) raw material for the (active) gaze of man takes the argument a step further into the structure of representation, adding a further layer demanded by the ideology of the patriarchal order as it is worked out in its favorite cinematic form - illusionistic narrative film. The argument returns again to the psychoanalytic background in that woman as representation signifies castration, inducing voyeuristic or fetishistic mechanisms to circumvent her threat. None of these interacting layers is intrinsic to film, but it is only in the film form that they can reach a perfect and beautiful contradiction, thanks to the possibility in the cinema of shifting the emphasis of the look. It is the place of the look that defines cinema, the possibility of varying it and exposing it. This is what makes cinema quite different in its voyeuristic potential from, say, strip-tease, theatre, shows, etc. Going far beyond highlighting a woman's to-be-looked-at-ness, cinema builds the way she is to be looked at into the spectacle itself. Playing on the tension between film as controlling the dimension of time (editing, narrative) and film as controlling the dimension of space (changes in distance, editing), cinematic codes create a gaze, a world, and an object, thereby producing an illusion cut to the measure of desire. It is these cinematic codes and their relationship to formative external structures that must be broken down before mainstream film and the pleasure it provides can be challenged.

 

To begin with (as an ending) the voyeuristic-scopophilic look that is a crucial part of traditional filmic pleasure can itself be broken down. There are three different looks associated with cinema: that of the camera as it records the pro-filmic event, that of the audience as it watches the final product, and that of the characters at each other within the screen illusion. The conventions of narrative film deny the first two and subordinate them to the third, the conscious aim being always to eliminate intrusive camera presence and prevent a distancing awareness in the audience. Without these two absences (the material existence of the recording process, the critical reading of the spectator), fictional drama cannot achieve reality, obviousness and truth. Nevertheless, as this article has argued, the structure of looking in narrative fiction film contains a contradiction in its own premises: the female image as a castration threat constantly endangers the unity of the diegesis and bursts through the world of illusion as an intrusive, static, one-dimensional fetish. Thus the two looks materially present in time and space are obsessively subordinated to the neurotic needs of the male ego. The camera becomes the mechanism for producing an illusion of Renaissance space, flowing movements compatible with the human eye, an ideology of representation that revolves around the perception of the subject; the camera's look is disavowed in order to create a convincing world in which the spectator's surrogate can perform with verisimilitude. Simultaneously, the look of the audience is denied an intrinsic force: as soon as fetishistic representation of the female image threatens to break the spell of illusion, and erotic image on the screen appears directly (without mediation) to the spectator, the fact of fetishisation, concealing as it does castration fear, freezes the look, fixates the spectator and prevents him from achieving any distance from the image in front of him.

 

This complex interaction of looks is specific to film. The first blow against the monolithic accumulation of traditional film conventions (already undertaken by radical filmmakers) is to free the look of the camera into its materiality in time and space and the look of the audience into dialectics, passionate detachment. There is no doubt that this destroys the satisfaction, pleasure and privilege of the 'invisible guest,' and highlights how film has depended on voyeuristic active/passive mechanisms. Women, whose image has continually been stolen and used for this end, cannot view the decline of the traditional film form with anything much more than sentimental regret.

 

--Laura Mulvey, originally published - Screen 16.3 Autumn 1975 pp. 6-18

Unfreedom of choice

As to freedom of choice: I have written elsewhere of the pseudo-choice offered to the adolescents of Amish communities who, after the strictest of upbringings, are invited at the age of seventeen to plunge themselves into every excess of contemporary capitalist culture—a whirl of fast cars, wild sex, drugs, drink and so forth. [2] After a couple of years, they are allowed to choose whether they want to return to the Amish way. Since they have been brought up in virtual ignorance of American society, the youngsters are quite unprepared to cope with such permissiveness, which in most cases generates a backlash of unbearable anxiety. The vast majority vote to return to the seclusion of their communities. This is a perfect case of the difficulties that invariably accompany ‘freedom of choice’: while Amish children are formally given a free choice, the conditions in which they must make it render the choice unfree.

 

The problem of pseudo-choice also demonstrates the limitations of the standard liberal attitude towards Muslim women who wear the veil: acceptable if it is their own free choice rather than imposed on them by husbands or family. However, the moment a woman dons the veil as the result of personal choice, its meaning changes completely: it is no longer a sign of belonging to the Muslim community, but an expression of idiosyncratic individuality. In other words, a choice is always a meta-choice, a choice of the modality of the choice itself: it is only the woman who does not choose to wear a veil that effectively chooses a choice. This is why, in our secular liberal democracies, people who maintain a substantial religious allegiance are in a subordinate position: their faith is ‘tolerated’ as their own personal choice, but the moment they present it publicly as what it is for them—a matter of substantial belonging—they stand accused of ‘fundamentalism’. Plainly, the ‘subject of free choice’, in the ‘tolerant’, multicultural sense, can only emerge as the result of an extremely violent process of being uprooted from one’s particular life-world.

 

The material force of the ideological notion of ‘free choice’ within capitalist democracy was well illustrated by the fate of the Clinton Administration’s ultra-modest health reform programme. The medical lobby (twice as strong as the infamous defence lobby) succeeded in imposing on the public the idea that universal healthcare would somehow threaten freedom of choice in that domain. Against this conviction, all enumeration of ‘hard facts’ proved ineffective. We are here at the very nerve-centre of liberal ideology: freedom of choice, grounded in the notion of the ‘psychological’ subject, endowed with propensities which he or she strives to realize. And this especially holds today, in the era of a ‘risk society’ in which the ruling ideology endeavours to sell us the very insecurities caused by the dismantling of the welfare state as the opportunity for new freedoms. If labour flexibilization means you have to change jobs every year, why not see it as a liberation from the constraints of a permanent career, a chance to reinvent yourself and realize the hidden potential of your personality? If there is a shortfall on your standard health insurance and retirement plan, meaning you have to opt for extra coverage, why not perceive it as an additional opportunity to choose: either a better lifestyle now or long-term security? Should this predicament cause you anxiety, the ‘second modernity’ ideologist will diagnose you as desiring to ‘escape from freedom’, of an immature sticking to old stable forms. Even better, when this is inscribed into the ideology of the subject as the ‘psychological’ individual, pregnant with natural abilities, you will automatically tend to interpret all these changes as the outcome of your personality, not as the result of being thrown around by market forces.

 

 

 

Politics of jouissance

What of the basic right to the pursuit of pleasure? Today’s politics is ever more concerned with ways of soliciting or controlling jouissance. The opposition between the liberal-tolerant West and fundamentalist Islam is most often condensed as that between, on the one side, a woman’s right to free sexuality, including the freedom to display or expose herself and to provoke or disturb men; and, on the other side, desperate male attempts to suppress or control this threat. (The Taliban forbade metal-tipped heels for women, as the tapping sounds coming from beneath an all-concealing burka might have an overpowering erotic appeal.)

 

Both sides, of course, mystify their position ideologically and morally. For the West, women’s right to expose themselves provocatively to male desire is legitimized as their right to enjoy their bodies as they please. For Islam, the control of female sexuality is legitimized as the defence of women’s dignity against their being reduced to objects of male exploitation. So when the French state prohibits Muslim girls from wearing the veil in school, one can claim that they are thus enabled to dispose of their bodies as they wish. But one can also argue that the true traumatic point for critics of Muslim ‘fundamentalism’ was that there were women who did not participate in the game of making their bodies available for sexual seduction, or for the social exchange and circulation involved in this. In one way or another, all the other issues—gay marriage and adoption, abortion, divorce—relate to this. What the two poles share is a strict disciplinary approach, differently directed: ‘fundamentalists’ regulate female self-presentation to forestall sexual provocation; pc feminist liberals impose a no-less-severe regulation of behaviour aimed at containing forms of harassment.

 

Liberal attitudes towards the other are characterized both by respect for otherness, openness to it, and an obsessive fear of harassment. In short, the other is welcomed insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as it is not really the other. Tolerance thus coincides with its opposite. My duty to be tolerant towards the other effectively means that I should not get too close to him or her, not intrude into his space—in short, that I should respect his intolerance towards my over-proximity. This is increasingly emerging as the central human right of advanced capitalist society: the right not to be ‘harassed’, that is, to be kept at a safe distance from others. The same goes for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism. War is acceptable insofar as it seeks to bring about peace, or democracy, or the conditions for distributing humanitarian aid. And does the same not hold even more for democracy and human rights themselves? Human rights are ok if they are ‘rethought’ to include torture and a permanent emergency state. Democracy is ok if it is cleansed of its populist excesses and limited to those mature enough to practise it.

 

Caught in the vicious cycle of the imperative of jouissance, the temptation is to opt for what appears its ‘natural’ opposite, the violent renunciation of jouissance. This is perhaps the underlying motif of all so-called fundamentalisms—the endeavour to contain (what they perceive as) the excessive ‘narcissistic hedonism’ of contemporary secular culture with a call to reintroduce the spirit of sacrifice. A psychoanalytic perspective immediately enables us to see why such an endeavour goes wrong. The very gesture of casting away enjoyment—‘Enough of decadent self-indulgence! Renounce and purify!’—produces a surplus-enjoyment of its own. Do not all ‘totalitarian’ universes which demand of their subjects a violent (self-)sacrifice to the cause exude the bad smell of a fascination with a lethal-obscene jouissance? Conversely, a life oriented towards the pursuit of pleasure will entail the harsh discipline of a ‘healthy lifestyle’—jogging, dieting, mental relaxation—if it is to be enjoyed to the maximum. The superego injunction to enjoy oneself is immanently intertwined with the logic of sacrifice. The two form a vicious cycle, each extreme supporting the other. The choice is never simply between doing one’s duty or striving for pleasure and satisfaction. This elementary choice is always redoubled by a further one, between elevating one’s striving for pleasure into one’s supreme duty, and doing one’s duty not for duty’s sake but for the gratification it brings. In the first case, pleasures are my duty, and the ‘pathological’ striving for pleasure is located in the formal space of duty. In the second case, duty is my pleasure, and doing my duty is located in the formal space of ‘pathological’ satisfactions.

 

 

 

Defence against power?

But if human rights as opposition to fundamentalism and as pursuit of happiness lead us into intractable contradictions, are they not after all a defence against the excess of power? Marx formulated the strange logic of power as ‘in excess’ by its very nature in his analyses of 1848. In The Eighteenth Brumaire and The Class Struggles in France, he ‘complicated’ in a properly dialectical way the logic of social representation (political agents representing economic classes and forces). In doing so, he went much further than the usual notion of these ‘complications’, according to which political representation never directly mirrors social structure—a single political agent can represent different social groups, for instance; or a class can renounce its direct representation and leave to another the job of securing the politico-juridical conditions of its rule, as the English capitalist class did by leaving to the aristocracy the exercise of political power. Marx’s analyses pointed towards what Lacan would articulate, more than a century later, as the ‘logic of the signifier’. Apropos the Party of Order, formed after the defeat of the June insurrection, Marx wrote that only after Louis-Napoleon’s December 10 election victory allowed it to ‘cast off’ its coterie of bourgeois republicans

 

was the secret of its existence, the coalition of Orléanists and Legitimists into one party, disclosed. The bourgeois class fell apart into two big factions which alternately—the big landed proprietors under the restored monarchy and the finance aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie under the July Monarchy—had maintained a monopoly of power. Bourbon was the royal name for the predominant influence of the interests of the one faction, Orléans the royal name for the predominant influence of the interests of the other faction—the nameless realm of the republic was the only one in which both factions could maintain with equal power the common class interest without giving up their mutual rivalry. [3]

This, then, is the first complication. When we are dealing with two or more socio-economic groups, their common interest can only be represented in the guise of the negation of their shared premise: the common denominator of the two royalist factions is not royalism, but republicanism. (Just as today, the only political agent that consistently represents the interests of capital as such, in its universality, above particular factions, is the ‘social liberal’ Third Way.) Then, in The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx dissected the makeup of the Society of December 10, Louis-Napoleon’s private army of thugs:

 

Alongside decayed roués with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaux [pimps], brothel-keepers, porters, literati, organ-grinders, rag-pickers, knife-grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French call la bohème; from this kindred element Bonaparte formed the core of the Society of December 10 . . . This Bonaparte, who constitutes himself chief of the lumpen proletariat, who here alone rediscovers in mass form the interests which he personally pursues, who recognizes in this scum, offal, refuse of all classes the only class upon which he can base himself unconditionally, is the real Bonaparte, the Bonaparte sans phrases. [4]

The logic of the Party of Order is here brought to its radical conclusion. In the same way that the only common denominator of all royalist factions is republicanism, the only common denominator of all classes is the excremental excess, the refuse, the remainder, of all classes. That is to say, insofar as the leader perceives himself as standing above class interests, his immediate class base can only be the excremental remainder of all classes, the rejected non-class of each class. And, as Marx develops in another passage, it is this support from the ‘social abject’ which enables Bonaparte to shift his position as required, representing in turn each class against the others.

 

As the executive authority which has made itself independent, Bonaparte feels it to be his task to safeguard ‘bourgeois order’. But the strength of this bourgeois order lies in the middle class. He poses, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is somebody solely because he has broken the power of that middle class, and keeps on breaking it daily. He poses, therefore, as the opponent of the political and literary power of the middle class. [5]

But there is more. In order for this system to function—that is, for the leader to stand above classes and not to act as a direct representative of any one class—he also has to act as the representative of one particular class: of the class which, precisely, is not sufficiently constituted to act as a united agent demanding active representation. This class of people who cannot represent themselves and can thus only be represented is, of course, the class of small-holding peasants, who

 

form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one other. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse . . . They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself. [6]

These three features together form the paradoxical structure of populist-Bonapartist representation: standing above all classes, shifting among them, involves a direct reliance on the abject/remainder of all classes, plus the ultimate reference to the class of those who are unable to act as a collective agent demanding political representation. This paradox is grounded in the constitutive excess of representation over the represented. At the level of the law, the state power merely represents the interests of its subjects; it serves them, is responsible to them, and is itself subject to their control. However, at the level of the superego underside, the public message of responsibility is supplemented by the obscene message of the unconditional exercise of power: ‘Laws do not really bind me, I can do to you whatever I want, I can treat you as guilty if I decide to do so, I can destroy you on a whim’. This obscene excess is a necessary constituent of the notion of sovereignty. The asymmetry here is structural: the law can only sustain its authority if subjects hear in it the echo of the obscene, unconditional self-assertion of power.

 

This excess of power brings us to the ultimate argument against ‘big’ political interventions which aim at global transformation: the terrifying experiences of the 20th century, a series of catastrophes which precipitated disastrous violence on an unprecedented scale. There are three main theorizations of these catastrophes. First, the view epitomized by the name of Habermas: Enlightenment is in itself a positive, emancipatory process with no inherent ‘totalitarian’ potential; the catastrophes that have occurred merely indicate that it remains an unfinished project, and our task should be to bring this project to completion. Second, the view associated with Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and, today, with Agamben. The ‘totalitarian’ bent of Enlightenment is inherent and definitive, the ‘administered world’ is its true consequence, and concentration camps and genocides are a kind of negative-teleological endpoint of the entire history of the West. Third, the view developed in the works of Etienne Balibar, among others: modernity opens up a field of new freedoms, but at the same time of new dangers, and there is no ultimate teleological guarantee of the outcome. The contest remains open and undecided.

 

The starting point of Balibar’s text on violence is the insufficiency of the standard Hegelian-Marxist notion of ‘converting’ violence into an instrument of historical Reason, a force which begets a new social formation. [7] The ‘irrational’ brutality of violence is thus aufgehoben, ‘sublated’ in the strict Hegelian sense, reduced to a particular ‘stain’ that contributes to the overall harmony of historical progress. The 20th century confronted us with catastrophes—some directed against Marxist political forces, others generated by Marxist engagement itself—which cannot be ‘rationalized’ in this way. Their instrumentalization into the tools of the Cunning of Reason is not only ethically unacceptable but also theoretically wrong, ideological in the strongest sense of the term. In his close reading of Marx, Balibar nonetheless discerns an oscillation between this teleological ‘conversion-theory’ of violence, and a much more interesting notion of history as an open-ended process of antagonistic struggles, whose final ‘positive’ outcome is not guaranteed by any encompassing historical necessity.

 

Balibar argues that, for necessary structural reasons, Marxism is unable to think the excess of violence that cannot be integrated into the narrative of historical Progress. More specifically, it cannot provide an adequate theory of fascism and Stalinism and their ‘extreme’ outcomes, Shoah and Gulag. Our task is therefore twofold: to deploy a theory of historical violence as something which cannot be instrumentalized by any political agent, which threatens to engulf this agent itself in a self-destructive vicious cycle; and also to pose the question of how to turn the revolutionary process itself into a civilizing force. As a counter-example, take the process that led to the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Catherine de Medici’s goal was limited and precise: hers was a Machiavellian plot to assassinate Admiral de Coligny—a powerful Protestant pushing for war with Spain in the Netherlands—and let the blame fall on the over-mighty Catholic family of de Guise. Thus Catherine sought to engineer the fall of both the houses that posed a menace to the unity of the French state. But the bid to play her enemies off against each other degenerated into an uncontrolled frenzy of blood. In her ruthless pragmatism, Catherine was blind to the passion with which men clung to their beliefs.

 

Hannah Arendt’s insights are crucial here, emphasizing the distinction between political power and the mere exercise of violence. Organizations run by direct non-political authority—Army, Church, school—represent examples of violence (Gewalt), not of political power in the strict sense of the term. [8] At this point, however, we need to recall the distinction between the public, symbolic law and its obscene supplement. The notion of the obscene double-supplement of power implies that there is no power without violence. Political space is never ‘pure’ but always involves some kind of reliance on pre-political violence. Of course, the relationship between political power and pre-political violence is one of mutual implication. Not only is violence the necessary supplement of power, but power itself is always-already at the root of every apparently ‘non-political’ relationship of violence. The accepted violence and direct relationship of subordination within the Army, Church, family and other ‘non-political’ social forms is in itself the reification of a certain ethico-political struggle. The task of critical analysis is to discern the hidden political process that sustains all these ‘non’ or ‘pre’-political relationships. In human society, the political is the encompassing structuring principle, so that every neutralization of some partial content as ‘non-political’ is a political gesture par excellence.

 

 

 

Humanitarian purity

It is within this context that we can situate the most salient human rights issue: the rights of those who are starving or exposed to murderous violence. Rony Brauman, who co-ordinated aid to Sarajevo, has demonstrated how the very presentation of the crisis there as ‘humanitarian’, the very recasting of a political-military conflict into humanitarian terms, was sustained by an eminently political choice—basically, to take the Serb side in the conflict. The celebration of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Yugoslavia took the place of a political discourse, Brauman argues, thus disqualifying in advance all conflicting debate. [9]

 

From this particular insight we may problematize, at a general level, the ostensibly depoliticized politics of human rights as the ideology of military interventionism serving specific economico-political ends. As Wendy Brown has suggested apropos Michael Ignatieff, such humanitarianism

 

presents itself as something of an anti-politics, a pure defence of the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defence of the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals. [10]

However, the question is: what kind of politicization do those who intervene on behalf of human rights set in motion against the powers they oppose? Do they stand for a different formulation of justice, or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects? For example, it is clear that the us-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein, legitimized in terms of ending the suffering of the Iraqi people, was not only motivated by hard-headed politico-economic interests but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions under which ‘freedom’ was to be delivered to the Iraqi people: liberal-democratic capitalism, insertion into the global market economy, etc. The purely humanitarian, anti-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus amounts to an implicit prohibition on elaborating a positive collective project of socio-political transformation.

 

At an even more general level, we might problematize the opposition between the universal (pre-political) human rights possessed by every human being ‘as such’ and the specific political rights of a citizen, or member of a particular political community. In this sense, Balibar argues for the ‘reversal of the historical and theoretical relationship between “man” and “citizen”’ that proceeds by ‘explaining how man is made by citizenship and not citizenship by man.’ [11] Balibar alludes here to Arendt’s insight on the condition of refugees:

 

The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships except that they were still human. [12]

This line, of course, leads straight to Agamben’s notion of homo sacer as a human being reduced to ‘bare life’. In a properly Hegelian dialectics of universal and particular, it is precisely when a human being is deprived of the particular socio-political identity that accounts for his determinate citizenship that—in one and the same move—he ceases to be recognized or treated as human. [13] Paradoxically, I am deprived of human rights at the very moment at which I am reduced to a human being ‘in general’, and thus become the ideal bearer of those ‘universal human rights’ which belong to me independently of my profession, sex, citizenship, religion, ethnic identity, etc.

 

What, then, happens to human rights when they are the rights of homo sacer, of those excluded from the political community; that is, when they are of no use, since they are the rights of those who, precisely, have no rights, and are treated as inhuman? Jacques Rancière proposes a salient dialectical reversal: ‘When they are of no use, one does the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. One gives them to the poor. Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes and rights.’ Nevertheless, they do not become void, for ‘political names and political places never become merely void’. Instead the void is filled by somebody or something else:

 

if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to enact the human rights that are their last recourse, then somebody else has to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place. This is what is called the ‘right to humanitarian interference’—a right that some nations assume to the supposed benefit of victimized populations, and very often against the advice of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The ‘right to humanitarian interference’ might be described as a sort of ‘return to sender’: the disused rights that had been sent to the rightless are sent back to the senders. [14]

So, to put it in the Leninist way: what the ‘human rights of Third World suffering victims’ effectively means today, in the predominant discourse, is the right of Western powers themselves to intervene politically, economically, culturally and militarily in the Third World countries of their choice, in the name of defending human rights. The reference to Lacan’s formula of communication (in which the sender gets his own message back from the receiver-addressee in its inverted, i.e. true, form) is very much to the point here. In the reigning discourse of humanitarian interventionism, the developed West is effectively getting back from the victimized Third World its own message in its true form.

 

The moment human rights are thus depoliticized, the discourse dealing with them has to change: the pre-political opposition of Good and Evil must be mobilized anew. Today’s ‘new reign of ethics’, clearly invoked in, say, Ignatieff’s work, thus relies on a violent gesture of depoliticization, depriving the victimized other of any political subjectivization. And, as Rancière points out, liberal humanitarianism à la Ignatieff unexpectedly meets the ‘radical’ position of Foucault or Agamben with regard to this depoliticization: their notion of ‘biopolitics’ as the culmination of Western thought ends up getting caught in a kind of ‘ontological trap’, in which concentration camps appear as ontological destiny: ‘each of us would be in the situation of the refugee in a camp. Any difference grows faint between democracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves to be already ensnared in the biopolitical trap’. [15]

 

We thus arrive at a standard ‘anti-essentialist’ position, a kind of political version of Foucault’s notion of sex as generated by the multitude of the practices of sexuality. ‘Man’, the bearer of human rights, is generated by a set of political practices which materialize citizenship; ‘human rights’ are, as such, a false ideological universality, which masks and legitimizes a concrete politics of Western imperialism, military interventions and neo-colonialism. Is this, however, enough?

 

 

 

Universality’s return

The Marxist symptomal reading can convincingly demonstrate the content that gives the notion of human rights its specific bourgeois ideological spin: universal human rights are effectively the right of white, male property-owners to exchange freely on the market, exploit workers and women, and exert political domination. This identification of the particular content that hegemonizes the universal form is, however, only half the story. Its crucial other half consists in asking a more difficult, supplementary question: that of the emergence of the form of universality itself. How—in what specific historical conditions—does abstract universality become a ‘fact of (social) life’? In what conditions do individuals experience themselves as subjects of universal human rights? Therein resides the point of Marx’s analysis of ‘commodity fetishism’: in a society in which commodity exchange predominates, individuals in their daily lives relate to themselves, and to the objects they encounter, as to contingent embodiments of abstract-universal notions. What I am, in terms of my concrete social or cultural background, is experienced as contingent, since what ultimately defines me is the ‘abstract’ universal capacity to think or to work. Likewise, any object that can satisfy my desire is experienced as contingent, since my desire is conceived as an ‘abstract’ formal capacity, indifferent to the multitude of particular objects that may, but never fully do, satisfy it.

 

Or take the example of ‘profession’: the modern notion of profession implies that I experience myself as an individual who is not directly ‘born into’ his social role. What I will become depends on the interplay between contingent social circumstances and my free choice. In this sense, today’s individual has a profession, as electrician, waiter or lecturer, while it is meaningless to claim that the medieval serf was a peasant by profession. In the specific social conditions of commodity exchange and the global market economy, ‘abstraction’ becomes a direct feature of actual social life, the way concrete individuals behave and relate to their fate and to their social surroundings. In this regard Marx shares Hegel’s insight, that universality becomes ‘for itself’ only when individuals no longer fully identify the kernel of their being with their particular social situation; only insofar as they experience themselves as forever ‘out of joint’ with it. The concrete existence of universality is, therefore, the individual without a proper place in the social edifice. The mode of appearance of universality, its entering into actual existence, is thus an extremely violent act of disrupting the preceding organic poise.

 

It is not enough to make the well-worn Marxist point about the gap between the ideological appearance of the universal legal form and the particular interests that effectively sustain it. At this level the counter-argument (made, among others, by Lefort and Rancière), that the form is never ‘mere’ form but involves a dynamics of its own, which leaves traces in the materiality of social life, is fully valid. It was bourgeois ‘formal freedom’ that set in motion the very ‘material’ political demands and practices of feminism or trade unionism. Rancière’s basic emphasis is on the radical ambiguity of the Marxist notion of the ‘gap’ between formal democracy—the Rights of Man, political freedoms—and the economic reality of exploitation and domination. This gap can be read in the standard ‘symptomatic’ way: formal democracy is a necessary but illusory expression of a concrete social reality of exploitation and class domination. But it can also be read in the more subversive sense of a tension in which the ‘appearance’ of égaliberté is not a ‘mere appearance’ but contains an efficacy of its own, which allows it to set in motion the rearticulation of actual socio-economic relations by way of their progressive ‘politicization’. Why shouldn’t women also be allowed to vote? Why shouldn’t workplace conditions be a matter of public concern as well?

 

We might perhaps apply here the old Lévi-Straussian term of ‘symbolic efficiency’: the appearance of égaliberté is a symbolic fiction which, as such, possesses actual efficiency of its own; the properly cynical temptation of reducing it to a mere illusion that conceals a different actuality should be resisted. It is not enough merely to posit an authentic articulation of a life-world experience which is then reappropriated by those in power to serve their particular interests or to render their subjects docile cogs in the social machine. Much more interesting is the opposite process, in which something that was originally an ideological edifice imposed by colonizers is all of a sudden taken over by their subjects as a means to articulate their ‘authentic’ grievances. A classic case would be the Virgin of Guadalupe in newly colonized Mexico: with her appearance to a humble Indian, Christianity—which until then served as the imposed ideology of the Spanish colonizers—was appropriated by the indigenous population as a means to symbolize their terrible plight.

 

Rancière has proposed a very elegant solution to the antinomy between human rights, belonging to ‘man as such’, and the politicization of citizens. While human rights cannot be posited as an unhistorical ‘essentialist’ Beyond with regard to the contingent sphere of political struggles, as universal ‘natural rights of man’ exempted from history, neither should they be dismissed as a reified fetish, the product of concrete historical processes of the politicization of citizens. The gap between the universality of human rights and the political rights of citizens is thus not a gap between the universality of man and a specific political sphere. Rather, it ‘separates the whole of the community from itself’. [16] Far from being pre-political, ‘universal human rights’ designate the precise space of politicization proper; what they amount to is the right to universality as such—the right of a political agent to assert its radical non-coincidence with itself (in its particular identity), to posit itself as the ‘supernumerary’, the one with no proper place in the social edifice; and thus as an agent of universality of the social itself. The paradox is therefore a very precise one, and symmetrical to the paradox of universal human rights as the rights of those reduced to inhumanity. At the very moment when we try to conceive the political rights of citizens without reference to a universal ‘meta-political’ human rights, we lose politics itself; that is to say, we reduce politics to a ‘post-political’ play of negotiation of particular interests.

 

 

 

 

------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Quoted in Bozidar Jezernik, Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers, London 2004, p. 233.

[2] ‘The constitution is dead. Long live proper politics’, Guardian, 4 June 2005.

[3] Marx and Engels, Selected Works, vol. i, Moscow 1969, p. 83.

[4] Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. xi, Moscow 1975, p. 149.

[5] Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. xi, p. 194.

[6] Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. xi, pp. 187–8.

[7] Etienne Balibar, ‘Gewalt’: entry for Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus, vol. 5, ed. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Hamburg 2002.

[8] Hannah Arendt, On Violence, New York 1970.

[9] Rony Brauman, ‘From Philanthropy to Humanitarianism’, South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 2–3, Spring–Summer 2004, pp. 398–9 and 416.

[10] Wendy Brown, ‘Human Rights as the Politics of Fatalism’, South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 2–3, p. 453.

[11] Etienne Balibar, ‘Is a Philosophy of Human Civic Rights Possible?’, South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 2–3, pp. 320–1.

[12] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York 1958, p. 297.

[13] See Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer, Stanford 1998.

[14] Jacques Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 2–3, pp. 307–9.

[15] Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, p. 301.

[16] Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, p. 305.

 

Concept of the Logic of the Signifier

 

What I am aiming to restore, piecing together indications dispersed through the work of Jacques Lacan, is to be designated the logic of the signifier - it is a general logic in that its functioning is formal in relation to all fields of knowledge including that of psychoanalysis which, in acquiring a specificity there, it governs; it is a minimal logic in that within it are given those pieces only which arc necessary to assure it a progression reduced to a linear movement, uniformally generated at each point of its necessary sequence. That this logic should be called the logic of the signifier avoids the partiality of the conception which would limit its validity to the field in which it was first produced as a category; to correct its linguistic declension is to prepare the way for its importation into other discourses, an importation which we will not fail to carry out once we have grasped its essentials here.

 

The chief advantage to be gained from this process of minimisation is the greatest economy of conceptual expenditure, which is then in danger of obscuring to you that the conjunctions which it effects between certain functions are so essential that to neglect them is to compromise analytic reasoning proper.

 

By considering the relationship between this logic and that which I will call logician's logic, we see that its particularity lies in the fact that the first treats of the emergence of the second. and should be conceived of as the logic of the origin of logic - which is to say, chat it docs not follow its laws, but that, prescribing their jurisdiction, itself falls outside that jurisdiction.

 

This dimension of the archeological can be grasped most succinctly through a movement back from the field of logic itself, where its miscognition. at its most radical because closest to is recognition is effected.

 

That this step repeats something of that which Derrida has shown to be exemplary to phenomenology [1] will conceal to none but the most hasty this crucial difference, that here miscognition finds its point of departure in the production of meaning. We can say that it is constituted not as a forgetting, but as a repression.

 

To designate it I choose the name of suture. Suture names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see that it figures there as the clement which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in. For, while there lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension - the general relation of lack to the structure - of which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies the position of a taking-the-place-of.

 

It is the objective of this paper to articulate the concept of suture which, if it is not named explicitly as such by Jacques Lacan, is constantly present in his system.

 

Let it be absolutely clear that it is not as philosopher or philosopher's apprentice that I am speaking here - if the philosopher is as characterized by Heinrich Heine in a sentence quoted by Freud, "with his nightcaps and the tatters of his dressing-gown, patching up the gaps in the structure of the universe". But take care not to think that the function of suturation is peculiar to the philosopher: what is specific to the philosopher is the determination of the field in which he operates as a "universal structure". It is important that you realize that the logician, like the linguist. also sutures at his particular level. And, quite as much. anyone who says "I".

 

In order to grasp suture we must cut across what a discourse makes explicit of itself, and distinguish from its meaning, its letter. This paper is concerned with a letter - a dead letter. It should come as no surprise if the meaning then dies.

 

The main thread of this analysis will be Gottlob Frege's argument in Grundlagen der Arithmetik, [2] crucial here because it puts into question those terms which in Peano's axiomatic, adequate for a construction of a theory of natural numbers, are taken as primary - that is, the zero, the number, the successor. [3] This calling into question of the theory, by disintricating, from the axiomatic where the theory is consolidated, the suturing, delivers up this last.

 

 

 

 

The Zero and the One

 

Here then is the question posed in its most general form;

 

what is it that functions in the series of whole natural

numbers to which we can assign their progression?

 

And the answer, which I shall give at once before establishing it:

 

in the process of the constitution of the series,

in the genesis of progression,

the function of the subjet, miscognized is operative.

 

This proposition will certainly appear as a paradox to anyone who knows that the logical discourse of Frege opens with the exclusion of that which is held by empiricist theory to be essential for the passage of the thing to the unit, and of the set of units to the unit of number: that is, the function of the subject, as support of the operations of abstraction and unification.

 

For the unity which is thus assured both for the individual and the set, it only holds in so far as the number functions as its name. Whence originates the ideology which makes of the subject the producer of fictions, short of recognizing it as the product of its product - an ideology in which logical and psychological discourse are wedded, with political discourse occupying the key position, which can be seen admitted in Occam, concealed in Locke, and miscognized thereafter.

 

A subject therefore, defined by attributes whose other side is political, disposing as of powers, of a faculty of memory necessary to close the set without the loss of any of the interchangeable elements, and a faculty of repetition which operates inductively. There is no doubt that it is this subject which Frege, setting himself from the start against the empiricist foundation of arithmetic. excludes from the field in which the concept of the number is to appear.

 

But if it is held that the subject is not reducible, in its most essential function, to the psychological, then its exclusion from the field of number is assimilable to repetition. Which is what I have to demonstrate.

 

You will be aware that Frege's discourse starts from the fundamental system comprising the three concepts of the concept, the object and the number, and two relations, that of the concept to the object, which is called subsumption and that of the concept to the number which I will call assignation. A number is assigned to a concept which subsumes objects.

 

What is specifically logical about this system is that each concept is only defined and exists solely through the relation which it maintains as subsumer with that which it subsumes. Similarly, an object only has existence in so far as it falls under a concept, there being no other determination involved in its logical existence, so that the object takes its meaning from its difference to the thing integrated, by its spatio-temporal localization, to the real.

 

Whence you can see the disappearance of the thing which must be effected in order for it to appear as object - which is the thing in so far as it is one,

 

It is dear that the concept which operates in the system, formed solely through the determination of subsumption, is a redoubled concept: the concept of identity to a concept.

 

This redoubling. induced in the concept by identity, engenders the logical dimension, because in effecting the disappearance of the thing it gives rise to the emergence of the numerable.

 

For example, if I group what falls under the concept "child of Agamemnon and Cassandra", I summon in order to subsume them Pelops and Teledamus. To this set I can only assign a number if I put into play the concept "identical to the concept: child of Agamemnon and Cassandra". Through the effect of the fiction of this concept, the children now intervene in so far as each one is, so to speak, applied to itself - which transforms it into a unit, and gives to it the status of an object which is numerable as such. It is this one of the singular unit, this one of identity of the subsumed, which is common to all numbers in so far as they are first constituted as units.

 

From this can be deduced the definition of the assignation of number: according to Frege "the number assigned to the concept F is the extension of the concept identical to the concept F". Frege's ternary system has as its effect that all that is left to the thing is the support of its identity with itself, by which it is the object of the operative concept, and hence numerable.

 

The process that I have just set out authorizes me to conclude the following proposition, whose relevance will emerge later, - the unit which could be called unifying of the concept in so far as it is assigned by the number is subordinate to the unit as distinctive in so far as it supports the number.

 

As for the position of the distinctive unit, its foundation is to be situated in the function of identity which, conferring on each thing of the world the property of being one, effects its transformation into an object of the (logical) concept.

 

At this point in the construction, you will sense all the importance of the definition of identity which I am going to present.

 

This definition which must give its true meaning to the concept of number, must borrow nothing from it [4] - precisely in order to engender numeration.

 

This definition, which is pivotal to his system, Frege takes from Leibniz. It is contained in this statement: eadem sunt quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva veritate. Those things are identical of which one can be substituted for the other salva veritate without loss of truth. Doubtless you can estimate the crucial importance of what is effected by this statement: the emergence of the function of truth. Yet what it assumes is more important than what it expresses. That is, identity-with-itself. That a thing cannot be substituted for itself, then where does this leave truth? Absolute is its subversion.

 

If we follow Leibniz's argument, the failing of truth whose possibility is opened up for an instant, its loss through the substitution for one thins of another, would be followed by its immediate reconstitution in a new relation: truth is recovered because the substituted thing, in that it is identical with itself, can be the object of a judgement and enter into the order of discourse: identical with itself, it can be articulated.

 

But that a thing should not be identical with itself subverts the field of truth, ruins it and abolishes it.

 

You will grasp to what extent the preservation of truth is implicated in this identity with itself which connotes the passage from the thing to the object. Identity-with-itself is essential if truth is to be saved.

 

Truth is. Each thing is identical with itself.

 

Let us now put into operation Frege's schema, that is, go through the three-stage itinerary which he prescribes to us. Let there be a thing X of the world. Let there be the empirical concept of this X. The concept which finds a place in the schema is not this empirical concept but that which redoubles it, being "identical with the concept of X". The object which falls under this concept is X itself, as a unit. In this the number, which is the third term of the sequence, to be assigned to the concept of X will be the number 1. Which means that this function of the number 1 is repetitive for all things of the world. It is in this sense that this 1 is only the unit which constitutes the number as such, and not the 1 in its personal identity as number with its own particular place and a proper name in the series of numbers.

 

Furthermore, its construction demands that, in order to transform it, we call upon a thing of the world - which, according to Frege, cannot be: the logical must be sustained through nothing but itself.

 

In order for the number to pass from the repetition of the 1 of the identical to that of its ordered succession, in order for the logical dimension to gain its autonomy definitively, without any reference to the real, the zero has to appear.

 

Which appearance is obtained because truth is, Zero is the assigned to the concept "not identical with itself". In effect, let there be the concept "not identical with itself". This concept, by virtue of being a concept, has an extension, subsumes an object. Which object? None. Since truth is, no object falls into the place of the subsumed of this concept, and the number which qualifies its extension is zero.

 

In this engendering of the zero, I have stressed that it is supported by the proposition that truth is. If no object falls under the concept of non-identical-with-itself, it is because truth must be saved. If there are no things which are not identical with themselves, it is because non-identity with itself is contradictory to the very dimension of truth. To its concept, we assign the zero. It is this decisive proposition that the concept of not-identical-with-itself is assigned by the number zero which sutures logical discourse.

 

For, and here I am working across Frege's text, in the autonomous construction of the logical through itself, it has been necessary, in order to exclude any reference to the real, to evoke on the level of the concept an object not-identical-with-itself, to be subsequently rejected from the dimension of truth.

 

The zero which is inscribed in the place of the number consummates the exclusion of this object. As for this place, marked out by subsumption, in which the object is lacking, there nothing can be written, and if a 0 must be traced, it is merely in order to figure a blank, to render visible the lack.

 

From the zero lack to the zero number, the non-conceptualisable is conceptualized.

 

Let us now set aside the zero lack in order to consider only that which is produced by the alternation of its evocation and its revocation, the zero number.

 

The zero understood as a number, which assigns to the subsuming concept the lack of an object, is as such a thing - the first non-real thing in thought.

 

If of the number zero we construct the concept, it subsumes as its sole object the number zero. The number which assigns it is therefore 1.

 

Frege's system works by the circulation of an element, at each of the places it fixes: from the number zero to its concept, from this concept to its object and to its number - a circulation which produces the 1. [5]

 

This system is thus so constituted with the 0 counting as 1. The counting of the 0 as 1 (whereas the concept of, the zero subsumes nothing in the real but a blank) is the general support of the series of numbers.

 

It is this which is demonstrated by Frege's analysis of the operation of the successor, which consists of obtaining the number which follows n by adding to it a unit: n' the successor of n, is equal to n + 1, that is, ... n... (n + 1) = n'... Frege opens out the n + 1 in order to discover what is involved in the passage from n to its successor.

 

You will grasp the paradox of this engendering as soon as I produce the most general formula for the successor which Frege arrives at: "the Number assigned to the concept member of the series of natural numbers ending with n follows in the series of natural numbers directly after n".

 

Let us take a number. The number three. It will serve to constitute the concept member of the series of natural numbers ending with three. We find that the number assigned to this concept is four. Here then is the 1 of n + 1. Where does it come from? Assigned to its redoubled concept, the number 3 functions as the unifying name of a set: as reserve. In the concept of' member of the series of natural numbers ending with 3", it is the term (in the sense both of element and of final element).

 

In the order of the real, the 3 subsumes 3 objects. In the order of number, which is that of discourse bound by truth, it is numbers which are counted: before the 3, there are 3 numbers - it is therefore the fourth.

 

In the order of number, there if an addition the 0 and the 0 counts for 1. The displacement of a number, from the function of reserve to that of term, implies the summation of the 0. Whence the successor. That which in the real is pure and simple absence finds itself through the fact of number (through the instance of truth) noted 0 and counted for 1.

 

Which is why we say the object not-identical with itself invoked-rejected by truth, instituted-annulled by discourse (subsumption as such) - in a word, sutured.

 

The emergence of the lack as 0, and of 0 as 1 determines the appearance of the successor. Let there be n; the lack is fixed as which is fixed as 1: n + 1; which is added in order to give n' - which absorbs the 1.

 

Certainly, if the Lot n + 1 is nothing other than the counting the zero, the function of addition of the sign + is superfatory, and we must restore to the horizontal representation of the engendering its verticality: the 1 is to be taken as the primary symbol of the emergence of lack in the field of truth, and the sign + indicates the crossing, the transgression through which the 0 lack comes to be represented as 1, producing, through this difference of n to n' which you have seen to be an effect of meaning the name of a number.

 

Logical representation collapses this three-level construction. The operation I have effected opens it out. If you consider the opposition of these two axes, you will understand what is at stake in logical suturing, and the difference of the logic which I am putting forward to logician's logic.

 

That zero is a number: such is the proposition which assures logical dimension of its closure.

 

Our purpose has been to recognize in the zero number the suturing stand-in for the lack.

 

Remember here the hesitation perpetuated in the work of Bertand Russell concerning its localization (interior? or exterior to the series of numbers?).

 

The generating repetition of the series of numbers is sustained by this, that the zero lack passes, first along a vertical axis, across the bar which limits the field of truth in order to be represented there as one, subsequently cancelling out as meaning in each of the names of the numbers which are caught up in the metonymic chain of successional progression.

 

Just as the zero as lack of the contradictory object must be distinguished from that which sutures this absence in the series of numbers, so the 1, as the proper name of a number, is to be distinguished from that which comes to fix in a trait the zero of the not-identical with itself sutured by the identity with itself, which is the law of discourse in the field of truth. The central paradox to be grasped (which as you will see in a moment is the paradox of the signifier in the sense of Lacan) is that the trait of the identical represents the non-identical, whence is deduced the impossibility of its redoubling, [6] and from that impossibility the structure of repetition, as the process of differentiation of the identical.

 

Now, if the series of numbers, metonymy of the zero, begins with its metaphor, if the o member of the series as number is only the standing-in-place suturing the absence (of the absolute zero) which moves beneath the chain according to the alternation of a representation and an exclusion - then what is there to stop us from seeing in the restored relation of the zero to the series of numbers the most elementary articulation of the subject's relation to the signifying chain?

 

The impossible object, which the discourse of logic summons as the not-identical with itself and then rejects as the pure negative, which it summons and rejects in order to constitute itself as that which it is, which it summons and rejects wanting to know nothing of it, we name this object, in so far as it functions as the excess which operates in the series of numbers, the subject.

 

Its exclusion from the discourse which internally it intimates is suture.

 

If we now determine the trail as the signifier, and ascribe to the number the position of signified, the relation of lack to the trait should be considered as the logic of the signifier.

 

 

 

 

Relation of Subject and Signifier

 

In effect, what in Lacanian algebra is called the relation of the subject to the field of the Other (as the locus of truth) can be identified with the relation which the zero entertains with the identity of the unique as the support of truth. This relation, in so far as it is matrical, cannot be integrated into any definition of objectivity - this being the doctrine of Lacan. The engendering of the zero, from this not-identical with itself under which no thing of the world falls, illustrates this to you.

 

What constitutes this relation as the matrix of the chain must be isolated in the implication which makes the determinant of the exclusion of the subject outside the field of the Other its representation in that field in the form of the one of the unique, one of distinctive unity, which is called "unary" by Lacan. In algebra, this exclusion is marked by the bar which strikes the S of the subject in from of the capital A, and which is displaced by the identity of the subject onto the A, according to the fundamental exchange of the logic of the signifier, a displacement whose effect is the emergence of signification signified to the subject. Untouched by the exchange of the bar, this exteriority of the subject to the Other is maintained, which institutes the unconscious.

 

For: - if it is clear that the tripartition which divides (1) the signified-to-the-subject, (2) the signifying chain whose radical alterity in relation to the subject cuts off the subject from its field, and finally (3) the external field of this reject, cannot be covered by the linguistic dichotomy of signified and signifier; - if the consciousness of the subject is to be situated on the level of the effects of signification, governed, so much so that they could even be called its reflections, by the repetition of the signifier: - if repetition itself is produced by the vanishing of the subject and its passage as lack - then only the unconscious can name the progression which constitutes the chain in the order of thought.

 

On the level of this constitution, the definition of the subject comes down to the possibility of one signifier more.

 

Is it not ultimately to this function of excess that can be referred the power of thematisation, which Dedekind assigns to the subject in order to give to set theory its theorem of existence? The possibility of existence of an enumerable infinity can be explained by this, that "from the moment that one proposition is true, 1 can always produce a second, that is, that the first is true and so on to infinity". [7]

 

In order to ensure that this recourse to the subject as the founder of iteration is not a recourse to psychology, we simply substitute for thematisation the representation of the subject (as signifier) which excludes consciousness because it is not effected for someone, but, in the chain, in the field of truth, for the signifier which precedes it. When Lacan faces the definition of the sign as that which represents something for someone, with that of the signifier as that which represents the subject for another signifier, he is stressing that in so far as the signifying chain is concerned, it is on the level of its effects and not of its cause that consciousness is to be situated. The insertion of the subject into the chain is representation, necessarily correlative to an exclusion which is a vanishing.

 

If now we were to try and develop in time the relation which engenders and supports the signifying chain, we would have to take into account the fact that temporal succession is under the dependency of the linearity of the chain. The time of engendering can only be circular - which is why both these propositions are true at one and the same time, that subject is anterior to signifier and that signifier is anterior to subject - but only appears as such after the introduction of the signifier. The retroaction consists essentially of this: the birth of linear time. We must hold together the definitions which make the subject the effect of the signifier and the signifier the representative of the subject: it is a circular, though non-reciprocal, relation.

 

By crossing logical discourse at its point of least resistance, that of its suture, you can see articulated the structure of the subject: as a "flickering in eclipses", like the movement which opens and closes the number, and delivers up the lack in the form of the 1 in order to abolish it in the successor.

 

As for the + you have understood the unprecedented function which it takes on in the logic of the signifier (a sign, no longer of addition, but of that summation of the subject in the field of the Other, which calls for its annulment). It remains to disarticulate it in order to separate the unary trait of emergence, and the bar of the reject: thereby making manifest the division of the subject which is the other name for its alienation.

 

It will be deduced from this that the signifying chain is structure of the structure.

 

If structural causality (causality in the structure in so far as the subject is implicated in it) is not an empty expression, it is from the minimal logic which I have developed here that it will find its status.

 

We leave for another time the construction of its concept.

Notes:

 

[1] Edmund Husserl, L'origine de la géometrie, translation and introduction by Jacques Derrida, PUF, 1962.

 

[2] German text with English translation published under the title The Foundations of Arithmetic, Basil Blackwell, 1953.

 

[3] Our reading will not concern itself with any of Frege'g various inflections of his basic purpose, and will therefore keep outside the thematisation of the difference of meaning and reference, as well as of the later definition of the concept in terms of predication, from which is deduced its non-saturation.

 

[4] Which is why we must say identity and not equality.

 

[5] I leave aside the commentary of paragraph 76 which gives the abstract definition of contiguity.

 

[6] And, at another level, the impossibility of meta-language (cf by Jacques Lacan, Cahiers pour 1'analyse, No I, 1966).

 

[7] Dedekind, quoted by Cavailles (Philosophie mathémathique, p 124, Hermann, 1962).

 

 

 

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This text was published in French in Cahiers pour l'analyse 1, Winter 1966, subsequently its English version translated by Jacqueline Rose appeared in Screen 18, Winter 1978.